Exporting Internet Law through International Trade Agreements: Recalibrating U.S. Trade Policy in the Digital Age by Erickson, Markham C. & Leggin, Sarah K.
Catholic University Journal of Law and Technology 
Volume 24 Issue 2 Article 4 
2016 
Exporting Internet Law through International Trade Agreements: 
Recalibrating U.S. Trade Policy in the Digital Age 
Markham C. Erickson 
Steptoe & Johnson LLP 
Sarah K. Leggin 
Steptoe & Johnson LLP 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.edu/jlt 
 Part of the Communications Law Commons, Consumer Protection Law Commons, Energy and 
Utilities Law Commons, First Amendment Commons, Intellectual Property Law Commons, International 
Law Commons, International Trade Law Commons, Internet Law Commons, Jurisdiction Commons, 
Privacy Law Commons, and the Science and Technology Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Markham C. Erickson & Sarah K. Leggin, Exporting Internet Law through International Trade Agreements: 
Recalibrating U.S. Trade Policy in the Digital Age, 24 Cath. U. J. L. & Tech (2016). 
Available at: https://scholarship.law.edu/jlt/vol24/iss2/4 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by CUA Law Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted 
for inclusion in Catholic University Journal of Law and Technology by an authorized editor of CUA Law Scholarship 
Repository. For more information, please contact edinger@law.edu. 
 
 317 
EXPORTING INTERNET LAW THROUGH 
INTERNATIONAL TRADE AGREEMENTS: 
RECALIBRATING U.S. TRADE POLICY IN 
THE DIGITAL AGE 
Markham C. Erickson & Sarah K. Leggin* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The United States recently concluded negotiations over a major, new multi-
lateral trade agreement known as the Trans-Pacific Partnership (“TPP”).1 Ne-
gotiations continue over two other major trade agreements. One is a negotia-
tion with the European Union over what is known as the Transatlantic Trade 
and Investment Partnership (“T-TIP”).2 The other involves negotiations with 
twenty-three countries over what is known at the Trade in Services Agreement 
(“TiSA”).3 In total, the three agreements involve 54 countries, representing a 
total of 40%, 50%, and 70% of global gross domestic product (“GDP”) respec-
tively and will serve as a global template for future trade agreements for many 
years.4 In short, in the trade universe, they are a big deal. 
Unfortunately, from what we can discern from these agreements, they fail to 
                                                 
* Markham Cho Erickson is a partner at Steptoe & Johnson LLP, where he works in the 
Telecommunications, Internet, and Media practice group. He also serves as the general 
counsel to the Internet Association. Sarah Leggin is an associate at Steptoe & Johnson LLP, 
working in the Telecommunications, Internet, and Media practice group.  This article is not 
necessarily a reflection of any views of any client of Steptoe & Johnson. 
 1 The Trans-Pacific Partnership, OFFICE OF U.S. TRADE REP., 
http://1.usa.gov/1BmqyjX (last visited Feb. 7, 2016). 
 2 Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (T-TIP), OFFICE OF U.S. TRADE REP., 
http://1.usa.gov/1RwnYhc (last visited Feb. 7, 2016) [hereinafter T-TIP]. 
 3 Trade in Services Agreement (TiSA), EUROPEAN COMM’N ON TRADE, 
http://bit.ly/1rJKR2H (last visited Feb. 7, 2016) [hereinafter TiSA-EU]. 
 4 Lydia DePillis, Everything You Need to Know About the Trans-Pacific Partnership, 
WASH. POST (Dec. 11, 2013), http://wapo.st/1TzUpMR; Samuel Benka, What Are the Bene-
fits of the TTIP?, AM. TRADE POL’Y (Feb. 3, 2014), http://bit.ly/1WJr4yV; The Trade In 
Services Agreement (TISA), COAL. OF SERV. INDUS., http://bit.ly/1rJKR2H (last visited Feb. 
7, 2016). 
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adequately address a key driver in today’s global economy, namely the Inter-
net. Indeed, current U.S. trade policy does not adequately address the im-
portance of the Internet’s many contributions.5 Given the Internet’s importance 
to the future of economic growth, innovation, and democratic discourse, Con-
gress and the executive branch should recalibrate asymmetrical trade policies 
that overweigh priorities of an older economy and under emphasize priorities 
of today’s Internet economy. 
This article proposes a recalibration of U.S. trade policy and the existing 
trade apparatus to better reflect the importance of the Internet and the laws that 
have made its rise possible. First, this article will review the current status of 
negotiations and amendments to U.S. trade legislation and agreements, which 
provide opportunities to implement these proposed reforms. Second, this arti-
cle will discuss the four laws that make the Internet work. Third, it will review 
the evolution of U.S. trade policy with changing economies and consumer de-
mands, and identify areas within U.S. trade authorities where reforms could be 
made. Finally, this article will propose structural and administrative reforms 
that would promote stronger Internet trade policy. 
A. Status of Trade Promotion Authority and Current Trade Negotiations 
Negotiations over TPP began in November 2009 when leaders of Australia, 
Brunei Darussalam, Chile, Malaysia, New Zealand, Peru, Singapore, Vietnam, 
and the United States announced consensus over the framework for a new 
trade agreement.6 Since that time, Canada and Mexico have been added to the 
negotiations.7 Negotiations resulting in an agreement concluded on October 5, 
2015.8 The agreement was the culmination of nineteen formal negotiating 
rounds involving more than twenty negotiating groups and undoubtedly count-
less more informal multilateral and bilateral discussions.9 
T-TIP is a trade and investment agreement being negotiated between the 
U.S. and European Union, which is intended to increase trade, create over 13 
                                                 
 5 See generally WILLIAM H. COOPER, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R41145, THE FUTURE OF 
U.S. TRADE POLICY: AN ANALYSIS OF ISSUES AND OPTIONS FOR THE 112TH CONGRESS 6-7, 
16-17 (2011), http://bit.ly/1QSf4wM. 
 6 Overview of the Trans Pacific Partnership, OFFICE OF U.S. TRADE REP., 
http://1.usa.gov/1K2rx9p (last visited Feb. 7, 2016). 
 7 Trans-Pacific Partnership: Summary of U.S. Objectives, OFFICE OF U.S. TRADE REP., 
http://1.usa.gov/1BmqyjX (last visited April, 16, 2016) [hereinafter TPP U.S. Objectives]. 
 8 Press Release, John Kerry, U.S. Dep’t of State, Successful Conclusion of Trans-
Pacific Partnership (TPP) Negotiations (Oct. 5, 2015), http://1.usa.gov/1QFVYKm. 
 9 Chronology of Events and Key Milestones, GLOB. AFFS. CANADA (Feb. 2, 2016), 
http://bit.ly/1qL48D5. 
2016] Recalibrating U.S. Trade Policy 319 
million jobs, and stimulate economic growth for both parties.10 The combined 
GDP of the U.S. and EU represent 50% of the world GDP, so the impact of T-
TIP on both economies is projected to be significant.11 Negotiations began in 
2013, and the latest round of negotiations were conducted in October 2015 in 
Miami, Florida.12 
TiSA is an agreement aimed at improving and expanding trade in services.13 
The agreement was initiated by the U.S. and Australia, and its participants 
have grown to fifty-one countries—representing 70% of the world’s trade in 
services.14 This is the first update to the latest major services agreement, the 
General Agreement on Trade in Services (“GATS”), which was established by 
the World Trade Organization (“WTO”) in 1995.15 
The key to the Obama Administration’s ability to successfully conclude the 
agreements was passage by Congress of so-called fast track negotiating author-
ity.16 Such power is contained in Trade Promotion Authority (“TPA”) legisla-
tion, in which Congress defines U.S. negotiating objectives and maintains the 
authority to review and ultimately decide whether any proposed U.S. trade 
agreement submitted by the executive branch will be implemented.17  TPA 
gives Congress the ability to vote, to approve, or disapprove a negotiated trade 
agreement; however, it precludes the legislative body from amending the nego-
tiated agreement. Administrations in both the past and present argue that this 
straight, up-or-down voting process gives the Office of the United States Trade 
Representative (“USTR”) greater ability to successfully negotiate complex 
trade agreements.18 Congress passed TPA legislation on June 25, 2015,19 and 
President Obama signed it into law on June 29, 2015.20 Prior to this legislation, 
Congress last approved TPA legislation in 2002.21 This means that it had been 
                                                 
 10 T-TIP, supra note 2. 
 11 Benka, supra note 4. 
 12 11th Round Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership Negotiations, OFFICE OF 
U.S. TRADE REP., http://1.usa.gov/1U53zSJ (last visited Feb. 7, 2016). 
 13 TiSA-EU, supra note 3 (“TiSA aims at opening up markets and improving rules in 
areas such as licensing, financial services, telecoms, e-commerce, maritime transport, and 
professionals moving abroad temporarily to provide services.”). 
 14 Id. 
 15 Id. 
 16 ‘Fast-track’ trade bill passes US Senate and awaits Obama nod, BBC NEWS (June 
25, 2015) [hereinafter ‘Fast-track’ trade bill], http://bbc.in/1LwlnCt. 
 17 Trade Promotion Authority, OFFICE OF U.S. TRADE REP., http://1.usa.gov/1F3Gq9c 
(last visited Feb. 7, 2016). 
 18 Id. (“Updating TPA ensures our trading partners know U.S. negotiators have the sup-
port of Congress when we call for greater ambition and stronger, high-standard trade agree-
ments.”). 
 19 ‘Fast-Track’ trade bill, supra note 16. 
 20 Greg Nelson, On Trade, Here’s What the President Signed into Law, WHITE HOUSE 
(June 29, 2015, 3:55 PM), http://1.usa.gov/1egmEzi. 
 21 IAN F. FERGUSSON & RICHARD S. BETH, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R43491, TRADE 
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fifteen years—or nearly 70% of the life of the commercial Internet—since 
Congress last gave an Administration the subject matter, objectives, and priori-
ties for a trade negotiation. In those fifteen years, USTR negotiated nearly six-
ty agreements.22 
Fifteen years ago, when Congress last assigned USTR its trade priorities, 
only 8.1% of the world was online.23  Most consumers still used dial-up con-
nections, as only 21% of Internet users had broadband service.24 Many con-
sumers still accessed content through the “walled garden” of information pro-
vided by portals, with no significant choice of websites or service providers.25 
There were only 3% of the number of websites available today.26 Facebook had 
not yet launched, and there were no significant video streaming video services 
like Netflix.27 In other words, the nature and use of the Internet have evolved 
significantly since Congress last provided the Administration with a list of 
trade priorities. Consequently, it is no wonder that U.S. trade policy did not 
meaningfully evolve during this key fifteen-year timeframe. Unfortunately, 
even though Congress is updating “goals-and-objectives” mandate for USTR,28 
Congress likewise does not appear poised to comprehensively change its prior-
ities in light of the role that Internet plays on the global stage. 
The USTR has described TPP as a new kind of agreement that reflects the 
                                                                                                                 
PROMOTION AUTHORITY (TPA): FREQUENTLY ASKED QUESTIONS 6 (2015), 
http://bit.ly/1QqNDYS. 
 22 Forty-two Trade and Investment Framework agreements have been initiated from 
2002 to present. See Trade and Investment Framework Agreements, OFFICE OF U.S. TRADE 
REP., http://1.usa.gov/1obJai7 (last visited Jan. 7, 2016). 17 Free Trade agreements have 
been initiated from 2002 to present. See Free Trade Agreements, OFFICE OF U.S. TRADE 
REP., http://1.usa.gov/1T5hRT7 (last visited Jan. 7, 2016). 
 23 Internet Users, INTERNET LIVE STATS, http://bit.ly/1w1NWRy (last visited Feb. 6, 
2016). 
 24 JOHN B. HORRIGAN & LEE RAINIE, PEW RESEARCH CTR., THE BROADBAND DIFFER-
ENCE: HOW ONLINE BEHAVIOR CHANGES WITH HIGH-SPEED INTERNET CONNECTIONS 9 
(2002), http://pewrsr.ch/1KLjWBE. 
 25 Salil K. Mehra, Paradise is a Walled Garden? Trust, Antitrust, and User Dynamism 
18 GEO. MASON L. REV. 889, 894 (2011) (“The term ‘walled garden’ typically refers to re-
strictions on user access or abilities that are, in some way, limited.”). 
 26 Total Number of Websites, INTERNET LIVE STATS, http://bit.ly/1UxmqaH (last visited 
Feb. 6, 2016); see also Anna Jane Grossman, What Online Internet Websites Looked Like in 
2001, MOTHERBOARD (Sept. 12, 2011, 9:41 AM), http://bit.ly/1QFFAcB (noting that in 2001 
the majority of Americans did not have internet). 
 27 Facebook was founded on Feb. 4, 2004. Nicholas Carlson, At Last – The Full Story of 
How Facebook Was Founded, BUS. INSIDER (Mar. 6, 2010, 4:10 AM), 
http://read.bi/1BtwXGn. Netflix added an online streaming service in mid 2007. Nate An-
derson, Netflix offers streaming movies to subscribers, ARSTECHNICA (Jan. 16, 2007, 11:02 
AM), http://bit.ly/20XyEZx. 
 28 See generally OFFICE OF U.S. TRADE REP., EXEC. OFFICE OF PRESIDENT, STRATEGIC 
PLAN FY 2013 – FY 2017, at 6-26 (2013), http://1.usa.gov/1oBQF1y. 
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characteristics of the modern economy.29 As the outlines to the agreement 
states, the TPP is “a landmark, 21st-century trade agreement, setting a new 
standard for global trade and incorporating next-generation issues that will 
boost the competitiveness of TPP countries in the global economy.”30 
USTR has promised that T-TIP “will be a cutting edge agreement aimed at 
providing greater compatibility and transparency in trade and investment regu-
lation, while maintaining high levels of health, safety, and environmental pro-
tection. T-TIP presents an extraordinary opportunity to strengthen the bond 
between vital strategic and economic partners.”31 
According to USTR: 
TiSA will encompass state-of-the-art trade rules aimed at promoting fair and open 
trade across the full spectrum of service sectors—from telecommunications and tech-
nology to distribution and delivery services. TiSA will also take on new issues con-
fronting the global marketplace, like restrictions on cross-border data flows that can 
disrupt the supply of services over the Internet—a rapidly expanding market for U.S. 
small businesses and entrepreneurs. And TiSA will support the development of 
strong, transparent, and effective regulatory policies, which are so important to ena-
bling international commerce.32 
The public’s ability to verify the veracity of such statements is limited. That 
is because the United States and its negotiating partners keep the texts of the 
agreements secret until the end of the negotiations.33 Select members of Con-
gress are able to review drafts of various provisions, which seems the very 
minimum kind of accommodation that can be afforded to the branch of gov-
ernment that has been given the constitutional authority to regulate trade.34 In 
addition, there are hundreds of “cleared advisors” representing various sectors 
of the economy that are able to review portions of the drafts confidentially.35 
                                                 
 29 Summary of the Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement, OFFICE OF U.S. TRADE REP., 
http://1.usa.gov/1QUf3UC (last visited Feb. 7. 2016) (“The TPP promotes innovation, 
productivity, and competitiveness by addressing new issues, including the development of 
digital economy…”). 
 30 Outlines of TPP, OFFICE OF U.S. TRADE REP., http://1.usa.gov/1GprfLV (last visited 
Feb. 7, 2016). 
 31 T-TIP, supra note 2. 
 32 Trade in Services Agreement, OFFICE OF U.S. TRADE REP., http://1.usa.gov/1SgvBtI 
(last visited Sept. 14, 2015). 
 33 JOHN HILARY, WAR ON WANT, THE TRANSATLANTIC TRADE AND INVESTMENT PART-
NERSHIP: 2015 UPDATE 26-27 (2015), http://bit.ly/1VEGkwS (“In a move reminiscent of 
Cold War espionage, the European Commission has even tagged official TTIP documents 
with secret markings in order to be able to trace any leaks back to their source.”). 
 34 U.S. CONST. art. 1 § 8, cl. 3 (“United States Congress shall have power “[t]o regulate 
Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the several States, and with the Indian 
Tribes.”). 
 35 Henry Farrell, Five Key Questions – and Answers – about the Leaked TPP Text, 
WASH. POST (Nov. 15, 2013), http://wapo.st/1QejN6z; TTIP: Already Disrupting Europe’s 
Precautionary Principle? AGRIC. & RURAL CONV. 2020 (Aug. 10, 2014), 
http://bit.ly/1QejPv9. 
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However, until drafts are final, they are not made available to the larger public, 
which has caused critics of these agreements to complain that there should be 
more transparency in the process as well as a means for the general public to 
provide more meaningful input.36  Whether texts of negotiations should be 
made public, and when, is beyond the scope of this article. 
Of course, it may not be surprising that throughout the negotiations, unoffi-
cial leaked versions of the agreements are routinely made available on the In-
ternet.37 The usefulness of leaked texts is limited, however, because they repre-
sent only a snapshot of the negotiations. Governments are forced to disavow 
any allegiance or opposition to the texts, so there is no way of knowing with 
certainty how up-to-date or accurate is any given leaked text. 
B. The Significance of the Internet 
The Internet38 has become in its short commercial lifespan a key engine for 
global economic growth, innovation, and democratic discourse. Beginning in 
earnest with the Internet’s commercial launch in the mid-1990s, by 2011 the 
Internet increased per capita GDP by $500 in mature countries over fifteen 
years.39 This growth generated by the Internet Revolution is equivalent to the 
growth generated by the Industrial Revolution after fifty years.40 Between 2004 
and 2009, the digital economy was the fastest growing sector of the U.S. econ-
omy, representing 15% of U.S. GDP growth during that period.41 
Over $8 trillion are exchanged through e-commerce each year.42 About two-
                                                 
 36 Farrell, supra note 35; Taylor Wofford, What is the Trans-Pacific Partnership and 
Why are Critics Upset By It?, NEWSWEEK (June 12, 2015, 1:12 PM), 
http://bit.ly/1cYWBLX. 
 37 Wofford, supra note 36. 
 38 When this article discusses the value that the Internet provides to the economy, it 
means the value created by Internet-related activities. The article does not define “Internet-
related activities,” but its use of this term refers generally to categories of activities devel-
oped by McKinsey in its reports on the economic impact of the Internet on the economy and 
refer generally to (i) activities that use the World Wide Web as support (e.g., e-commerce, 
online content, online advertising); (ii) communication using Internet Protocol; (iii) software 
and service activities linked to the World Wide Web; and (iv) hardware manufacturers or 
services that provide maintenance of Web-specific tools (e.g., computers, smartphones, 
other devices, Internet servers). See MATTHIEU PÉLISSIÉ DU RAUSAS ET AL., MCKINSEY 
GLOBAL INST., INTERNET MATTERS: THE NET’S SWEEPING IMPACT ON GROWTH, JOBS AND 
PROSPERITY 7, 10 (2011), http://bit.ly/1XGLdGK. 
 39 Id. at 19. 
 40 Id. 
 41 Id. at 16. 
 42 JAMES MANYIKA & CHARLES ROXURGH, MCKINSEY GLOBAL INST., THE GREAT 
TRANSFORMER: THE IMPACT OF THE INTERNET ON ECONOMIC GROWTH AND PROSPERITY 1 
(2011), http://bit.ly/1T7D2oe. 
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thirds of all businesses have a web presence in developed markets, and over a 
recent five-year period, the Internet accounted for 21% of GDP growth in 
countries that represent more than 70% of global GDP and 15% GDP growth 
over the same time period in the United States.43 The Internet creates a 10% 
increase in productivity for small- and medium-sized businesses (“SMEs”), 
and SMEs that heavily utilize Internet-related technologies export twice as 
much as competitors who do not.44 
At the individual level, the Internet adds to consumer surplus. Economists 
define “consumer surplus” as the monetary gain that consumers obtain as a 
result of purchasing a product at a lower price than the highest price that he 
would be willing to pay.45 In 2009, France received $10 billion in consumer 
surplus through the Internet and the United States received $64 billion.46 
Viewed another way, the Internet created between $18 to $28 per month in 
added value per user in Germany and the United Kingdom respectively.47 Even 
when the Internet disrupts older industries, the Internet creates 2.4 jobs for eve-
ry job that is eliminated through such disruption.48 In fact, the Internet econo-
my comprises a significant portion of the global economy as a whole. From 
2006 to 2011, the Internet in mature economies accounted for 21% of the GDP 
growth, with traditional industries capturing around 75% of the benefits.49 
From 2007 to 2012, Internet-related industries increased the nominal value 
added to the U.S. economy by approximately 110.4%.50 Just two years ago, in 
2014, Internet industries were estimated to be responsible for 6% of real U.S. 
GDP—over $966 billion, and the Internet sector continues to grow.51 Internet 
industries comprise the sector of the economy that has generated the larger 
increases in nominal value added to the economy than many traditional indus-
tries including chemical products, accommodation and food services, and fi-
nance and insurance.52 
Today, over 3.3 billion people use the Internet.53 In the U.S. alone, since 
2006, the number of Internet users has risen by approximately 100 million, and 
                                                 
 43 PÉLISSIÉ DU RAUSAS ET AL., supra note 38, at 16. 
 44 Id. at 17. 
 45 Mansur G. Abdullah et al., Consumer surplus, ENCYC. BRITANNICA, 
http://bit.ly/1VPmfnx (last visited Feb. 7, 2016). 
 46 MANYIKA & ROXURGH, supra note 42, at 5 exh.4. 
 47 Id. 
 48 Id. at 4. 
 49 PÉLISSIÉ DU RAUSAS ET AL., supra note 38, at 16, 22. 
 50 STEPHEN E. SIWEK, INTERNET ASS’N, MEASURING THE U.S. INTERNET SECTOR 48 tbl.F-
1 (2015), http://bit.ly/20VFHQV. 
 51 Id. at 52 tbl.F-11. 
 52 Id. at 5. 
 53 Internet Users, supra note 23. 
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user penetration of the Internet has reached 92%.54 Now, the Internet is used in 
every country, in every sector, and by most businesses.55 Consumption and 
expenditure that may be attributed to the Internet are higher than the agricul-
ture or energy sectors.56 If Internet consumption and expenditure were a sector, 
its total contribution to GDP would be bigger than Spain’s or Canada’s GDPs 
and is growing faster than Brazil’s economy.57  Additionally, more than three 
quarters of the value created by the Internet accrues to traditional industries.58 
In 2012, U.S. manufacturers exported $86.5 billion in products and services 
ordered on-line, and during the same year, they only imported $50.7 billion in 
goods and services on-line the same year.59 In other words, there is a $36 bil-
lion “digital trade surplus” that the U.S. could expand across a range of trade 
agreements. This could benefit not only technology companies and manufac-
turers, but also companies and workers in every sector of the economy, and 
consumers across the globe.60 
II. THE LAWS THAT MAKE THE INTERNET WORK 
Internet companies born in the United States dominate their worldwide 
competitors.61 This control of the market is largely due to the fact that America 
invented the Internet.62 Today, however, the Internet has become a decidedly 
global product and platform. So what explains the continued worldwide domi-
nance of U.S.-born Internet companies? The answer in no small part is the fact 
that the United States, the incubator of those dominant firms, has the most In-
ternet-friendly legal system in the world.63 A friendlier incubator, in terms of 
the legal environment, quite naturally results in a healthier and stronger firm 
                                                 
 54 SIWEK, supra note 50, at 10. 
 55 PÉLISSIÉ DU RAUSAS ET AL., supra note 38, at 9-10. 
 56 Id. at 14 exh.3; see also BUREAU OF ECON. ANALYSIS, U.S. DEP’T OF COMMERCE, 
GROSS-DOMESTIC-PRODUCT-(GDP)-BY-INDUSTRY DATA-VALUE ADDED (2016) [hereinafter 
VALUE ADDED GDP DATA], http://1.usa.gov/1Ld3eek (showing that agriculture and energy 
sectors accounted for 1.4% and 1.6% of value added to GDP in 2013 respectively). 
 57 PÉLISSIÉ DU RAUSAS ET AL., supra note 38, at 14. 
 58 Robert W. Holleyman II, Deputy U.S. Trade Representative, Digital Economy and 
Trade: A 21st Century Leadership Imperative, Address Before the New Democratic Net-
work (May 1, 2015) [hereinafter Holleyman NDN Address], http://1.usa.gov/1FoOvJY. 
 59 Id. 
 60 Id. 
 61 Id. 
 62 The Invention of the Internet, HIST. CHANNEL, http://bit.ly/NcHeDF (last visited Feb. 
7, 2016); see also Matt Krantz, 5 Companies Grab 70% of Your Online Dollars, USA TO-
DAY (Nov. 5, 2015, 2:52 PM), http://usat.ly/1Ld3TfI. 
 63 INTERNET ASS’N, THE INTERNET IS A CRITICAL STAKEHOLDER IN TRADE (2013), 
http://bit.ly/1SV0eWo. 
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relative to those firms born in less accommodating environments. 
The open, innovation-without-permission Internet ecosystem enjoyed in the 
United States was not the teleological result of its conception or of any immu-
table characteristics of its technology. The Internet’s architecture was the result 
of specific policy decisions to design an open platform free of centralized con-
trol.64 Just as easily, the Internet could have been designed as a closed system, 
controlled by a ruling oligarchy of firms. Dr. Vint Cerf, who has been de-
scribed as the “Father of the Internet,”65 discussed this policy choice in a con-
gressional testimony: 
The Internet’s open, neutral architecture has proven to be an enormous engine for 
market innovation, economic growth, social discourse, and the free flow of ideas. The 
remarkable success of the Internet can be traced to a few simple network principles—
end-to-end design, layered architecture, and open standards—which together give 
consumers choice and control over their online activities. This “neutral” network has 
supported an explosion of innovation at the edges of the network, and the growth of 
companies like Google, Yahoo, eBay, Amazon, and many others. Because the net-
work is neutral, the creators of new Internet content and services need not seek per-
mission from carriers or pay special fees to be seen online. As a result, we have seen 
an array of unpredictable new offerings—from Voice-over-IP to wireless home net-
works to blogging—that might never have evolved had central control of the network 
been required by design.66 
Dr. Cerf’s testimony was given in the context of a debate over Congress’ 
consideration of network neutrality legislation.67 He testified that broadband 
Internet access providers, which had the technical means of manipulating the 
end-to-end connections among users of the Internet, could change the design 
characteristics of the open Internet.68 
Beyond the scope of his testimony, however, Dr. Cerf took for granted the 
patchwork of laws that enabled his design choices to be fully realized. This 
legal quilt is comprised of four laws. 
 First Amendment to the United States Constitution69 
 Section 107 of the Copyright Act of 1976 (codification of the doc-
trine of “fair use”)70 
 Section 230 of the Communications Decency Act of 199671 
 Digital Millennium Copyright Act72 
                                                 
 64 Net Neutrality: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Commerce, Sci. & Transp., 109th 
Cong. (2006) [hereinafter Net Neutrality Hearings], http://1.usa.gov/1FRNo3M (prepared 
statement of Vinton G. Cerf, Vice President & Chief Internet Evangelist, Google Inc.). 
 65 Grant A. Yang, Can-Spam: A First Step to No-Spam, 4 CHI.-KENT J. INTELL. PROP. 1, 
44 (2004). 
 66 Net Neutrality Hearings, supra note 64. 
 67 Id. 
 68 Id. 
 69 U.S. CONST. amend I. 
 70 Copyright Act of 1976 § 107, 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2012). 
 71 Communications Decency Act of 1996 § 230, 47 U.S.C. § 230 (2012). 
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These four critical and uniquely American laws serve as the cornerstones to 
the legal foundation that supports the open, innovation-without-permission 
Internet. Obviously, the first two laws were conceived prior to anyone’s con-
templation of the Internet. The First Amendment was adopted on December 
15, 1791, as part of the Bill of Rights.73 The legal concept of fair use was codi-
fied in the Copyright Act on October 19, 1976 and went into effect January 1, 
1978.74 Congress adopted the second batch of laws at the dawn of the commer-
cial Internet in a two-year period of perhaps unprecedented congressional pres-
cience. These laws represent the recognition that the success of the Internet 
would not occur without government intervention. 
This article will next briefly describe the role played by each of these four 
laws relative to the Internet. Each law’s influence on the Internet could be—
and has been—the subject of its own article. Consequently, this article is meant 
only to provide a summary of how the law interacts with the Internet. 
A. First Amendment 
Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or pro-
hibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the 
press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the gov-
ernment for a redress of grievances.75 
The first case to analyze the First Amendment’s broad application to the In-
ternet was Reno v. ACLU.76 In this critically important case, the Supreme Court 
ruled that certain provisions of the Communications Decency Act violated the 
First Amendment because of its provisions amounted to a content-based blan-
ket restriction of free speech.77 In its opinion, the Court noted and affirmed the 
trial court’s finding that “content on the Internet is as diverse as human 
thought.”78 The Court, in applying strict scrutiny to the restrictions, concluded 
that there was “no basis for qualifying the level of First Amendment scrutiny 
that should be applied to this medium.”79 Justice Stevens, writing for the ma-
jority, said, “[t]hrough the use of chat rooms, any person with a phone line can 
become a town crier with a voice that resonates farther than it could from any 
                                                                                                                 
 72 Digital Millennium Copyright Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-304, 112 Stat. 2860 (Oct. 
28, 1999) (codified at 17 U.S.C. §§ 512, 1201-1205, 1301-32; 28 U.S.C. § 4001). 
 73 See S. DOC. NO. 112-9, at 25 n.2 (2012). 
 74 Copyright Act § 107. 
 75 U.S. CONST. amend I. 
 76 Reno v. Am. Civ. Liberties Union et al., 521 U.S. 844 (1997). 
 77 Id. at 868. 
 78 Id. at 852 (internal citations omitted). 
 79 Id. at 870 
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soapbox.”80 
At the time this case was being litigated in 1997, Internet companies had ap-
proximately 12 million individual subscribers.81 There were about 100,000 new 
messages posted daily in newsgroups.82 “Tens of thousands” of users engaged 
in conversations on a huge range of subjects.83 No doubt these facts influenced 
the Court’s determination that the Internet should be protected from laws that 
would chill speech or deny access to speech that was flourishing on this new 
medium.84 Given the medium’s nascence, these statistics were cited with some 
degree of awe. Consider, today, how much more compelling are the statistics 
from just two companies on the Internet: Facebook has over 1.5 billion active 
users and Twitter facilitates more than 500 million new tweets every day.85   
First Amendment jurisprudence also protects anonymous speech,86 which al-
lows for robust discourse without fear of retaliation or embarrassment.87 This 
not only facilitates political speech, it facilitates user comments that can help 
others decide whether to buy a product, see a movie, or eat at a restaurant. This 
broad application of the First Amendment to the medium of the Internet (as 
contrasted with other mass media such as broadcast radio, broadcast television, 
and cable television) contributed to the invention of more recent groundbreak-
ing companies such as Facebook, Twitter, and Yelp.88 
The First Amendment also helps the Internet by ensuring limitations to 
overbroad application of exclusivity rights given creators under copyright law. 
Courts have in a number of cases said that the fair use doctrine is a safety valve 
that protects certain applications of exclusive rights from arguments that such 
rights violate the First Amendment.89 
Finally, the First Amendment compels a limitation on the interpretation of 
the Copyright Clause to the creative expression of an author and not to facts. In 
Feist, the Supreme Court held that the Constitution mandates originality—”a 
modicum of creativity”—as a prerequisite for copyright protection.90 While it 
is possible to arrange facts in a way that renders the composition a new work 
of authorship, the decision recognizes that copyright law should give the public 
                                                 
 80 Id. 
 81 Id. at 850-51. 
 82 Reno, 521 U.S. at 851. 
 83 Id. at 852. 
 84 See id. at 871-72. 
 85 Live, INTERNET LIVE STATS, http://bit.ly/1cWKuda (last visited Sept. 14, 2015). 
 86 McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm’n, 514 U.S. 334, 341 (1995). 
 87 Id. at 341-42. 
 88 See Brief of Automattic, Inc. et al., as Amici Curiae Supporting Appellant at 25-26, 
Yelp, Inc. v. Hadeed Carpet Cleaning, Inc., 770 S.E.2d 440 (Va. 2015) (No. 140242). 
 89 See e.g., Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186 (2003); Harper & Row Publs., Inc., v. Na-
tion Enters. et al., 471 U.S. 539 (1985). 
 90 Feist Pub’ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., Inc., 499 U.S. 340, 346 (1991). 
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flexibility to use, share, analyze, arrange, and redistribute facts, news, and in-
formation without fear of liability. 
The Feist decision has a very real, practical effect on the Internet and the in-
formation economy. One need only think of how often, every day, the Internet 
is used to investigate facts and how this adds value to our lives. For example, 
the vast resources available on the Internet have made it much easier to quickly 
verify facts and has increased the integrity of news journalism.91  The U.S. Se-
curities and Exchange Commission warns would-be investors to “arm yourself 
with information,”92 and most consumers use the Internet for research before 
making purchases.93 
Perhaps because Europe does not have an equivalent to the First Amend-
ment, the European Commission’s reaction to the Feist decision was to enact 
the Database Directive.94 The Database Directive—adopted in February 
1996—created a “sui generis” right for database creators to protect their data-
bases regardless of whether it qualifies for copyright protection for a period of 
fifteen years.95 Whether the Directive had an actual impact on potential start-up 
activity in Europe is not known.96 At least one study, however, notes that the 
Directive has not meaningfully benefited the stakeholders that the Directive 
was meant to protect—the publishing industry.97 
Consider also that a lack of First Amendment protections, where countries 
regulate speech, has caused in some instances the total ban on an Internet com-
pany’s services. For instance, countries like Russia and Turkey have taken 
                                                 
 91 Glenn Kessler, The Global Boom in Political Fact Checking, WASH. POST (June 13, 
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 94 Council Directive 96/9/EC, 1996 O.J. (L 77/20) (EU). 
 95 Id. art. 7. 
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EU, FIN. TIMES (Jan. 2, 2006, 5:31 PM), http://on.ft.com/1QeDFqb. 
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steps toward restricting free speech online. Russia signed a new law requiring 
popular online personalities to register with the government, which would ena-
ble the government to more easily track them online.98 In 2014, Turkey infa-
mously blocked the social-media platform, Twitter, ahead of its elections in 
order to prevent users from sharing information about alleged government cor-
ruption.99 
In the United States, the government largely has refrained from attempting 
to impose speech restrictions on the Internet.100 The U.S. government’s general 
hands-off approach to speech on the Internet facilitates investment in, and use 
of, interactive Internet sites such as Facebook, Twitter, and countless others.101 
B. Section 107 of the Copyright Act (Fair Use Doctrine) 
Copyright law in the United States is centered on strong, exclusive rights for 
authors. Specifically, Section 106 of the Copyright Act gives authors five ex-
clusive rights: 
 the right to reproduce a work 
 the right to create derivative works of the original work 
 the right to distribute copies of the work to the public 
 the right to display the work publicly, and 
 the right to perform the work publicly.102 
These exclusive rights are balanced by Section 107 of the Copyright Act.103 
Section 107 permits certain uses of the copyrighted work notwithstanding the 
author’s exclusive rights in it, and explicitly allows its use for criticism, news 
reporting, teaching, scholarship, or research purposes in qualified circumstanc-
es.104 In addition to these specific uses, Section 107 provides four factors to be 
considered in determining whether a use qualifies as a fair use: 
 the purpose and character of the use (e.g., transformative or repro-
ductive); 
 the nature of the copyrighted work (e.g., the degree of creativity); 
 the amount and substantiality of the portion of the original work 
used; and 
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 the effect of the use upon the market (or potential market) for the 
original work.105 
In the past, fair use was a regime most vocally supported by consumers, li-
braries, and academics.106 Quite naturally, corporate America—to the extent it 
cared about copyright law—was more concerned about Section 106 and the 
exclusive rights afforded authors.107 
The Internet economy has created a new voice in corporate America. These 
voices are made up of companies that benefit more from the exceptions to cop-
yright protection than from the exclusive rights.108 For the first time in U.S. 
history, there is an increasingly vocal corporate voice advocating for ensuring 
that U.S. copyright law remains balanced—supporting both the strong protec-
tions for authors but ensuring equally strong limitations as well as excep-
tions.109 
Moreover, the Internet industry has been able to document its tangible, eco-
nomic contribution to the U.S. economy. For example, in 2007, fair use indus-
tries generated total revenue averaging $4.7 trillion, representing a 36% in-
crease from 2002.110 In that same year, these industries contributed on average 
about $2.2 trillion in added value—just over 16% of total U.S. GDP.111 
As noted earlier, there is a constitutional dimension to fair use. Legal schol-
ars have long recognized the tension between Article I, Section 8 of the U.S. 
Constitution, which authorizes Congress to provide copyright protection to 
authors, and the First Amendment, which prohibits Congress from passing leg-
islation restricting speech.112 Interested parties have exploited this tension in an 
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attempt to convince courts to declare various provisions of the Copyright Act 
unconstitutional.113 
Why is the constitutional import of fair use significant? It is so because fair 
use provides constitutional balances to the limiting effects of exclusive 
rights.114 In other words, fair use provides constitutional symmetry in U.S. cop-
yright law, which provides a balanced, strong foundation to both the exclusive 
rights of authors—established pursuant to the intellectual property clause of 
the constitution—and the limitations and exceptions to those rights—
established pursuant to both the intellectual property clause (relative to the lim-
ited duration of such rights) and the first amendment (relative to the rights of 
others to use authors’ works without consent notwithstanding the authors’ ex-
clusive rights).115 In sum, fair use is the constitutional safety valve that permits 
the limited monopolies provided to authors. Fair use reconciles the Constitu-
tion’s intellectual property clause with the First Amendment. 
None of the United States’ trading partners possesses the same constitutional 
framework. In fact, only a handful of countries around the world have a similar 
fair use statute.116 In other parts of the world, legal systems incorporate specific 
statutory limitations and exceptions created by regulators or legislatures.117 The 
reliance of an ex-ante regulatory or legislative approval system has obvious 
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shortcomings when applied to the fast-moving pace of Internet technologies 
and business models. 
There are two key examples of activities permitted by fair use that are criti-
cal to the digital environment. 
1. Fair Use and Search Engines 
Perhaps the most high-profile Internet company benefiting from fair use is 
Google. Early search engines were inefficient.118 Yahoo’s search engine, for 
example, involved human editors who organized websites on the World Wide 
Web into categories, such as “finance,” “entertainment,” “movies,” “health,” 
“style,” “politics,” and numerous other categories.119 Search engine technology 
became less reliant on human editors when they began dispatching software120 
that scanned a website’s metadata, which the website’s creators filled with key 
words that described the contents of the website.121 These early search engines 
were totally reliant on websites’ creators to fill the sites’ metadata with accu-
rate descriptions of the content of the sites. Not surprisingly, website creators 
sometimes inaccurately described the website to manipulate search results. 
Still, this system was much more efficient than its prior iteration that relied on 
human editors. 
Google significantly upgraded search technology by not just searching a 
website’s metadata, but instead enabling its robots to copy the entire content of 
the site. When a user enters a query into Google’s search box, the user is 
searching not the Internet but rather a recently stored copy of the Internet that 
resides on Google’s computers. Today, all major search engines “crawl” and 
copy the World Wide Web and store such copy on their computers.122 The stor-
age of the contents of entire websites allows these search engines to create al-
gorithms that can make the responses to a user’s search query much more rele-
vant than prior search engine iterations that used only the descriptive terms in a 
site’s metadata.123 Relevant for our purposes, these search engines engage in 
widespread, automatic copying of other people’s content without the authority 
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of the content creators.124 Notwithstanding the content creator’s exclusive right 
under the Copyright Act to limit the copying of her work, fair use allows 
search engines to engage in such permission-less copying.125 
It is worth noting that while U.S. courts have upheld such permission-less 
copying, this activity is not expressly permitted under Internet laws in the Eu-
ropean Union.126 Article 5(1) of the EU Copyright Directive establishes an ex-
ception for temporary and incidental copies that do not have economic signifi-
cance, but a search engine’s ability to rely on this law has not been tested in the 
European courts.127 The EU E-Commerce Directive includes safe harbors for 
mere-conduit, caching, and hosting functions, however, the exceptions do not 
encompass information location tools (as search engines are known under the 
DMCA, for example).128 
2. Fair Use and Cloud Computing 
Faster broadband speeds, cheap storage costs, and ubiquitous, multi-device 
connectivity to the Internet have shifted storage of content from a user’s per-
sonal computer to the “cloud.”129 Cloud-based storage allows a user to keep 
copies of her content in a remote location that gives her access to such content 
anywhere she is connected to the Internet.130 A user can download this content 
to multiple devices at different times or stream audiovisual content using a 
software-based audiovisual player.131 
The growth of the cloud-based ecosystem has been dramatic. Since 2014, 
cloud-based traffic has grown from 3.5 to 5.6 zettabytes, and is projected to 
triple to 10.4 zettabyes by 2019.132  Mobile cloud apps made up 81% of mobile 
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data traffic in 2014.133 Mobile cloud traffic is projected to grow eleven-fold 
from 2014 to 2019.134 In that time, over 80% of workloads will be processed by 
cloud data centers, with cloud workload growth tripling compared to tradition-
al data center workloads growing at a much slower rate.135 The global market 
for cloud services (or Infrastructure-as-a-Service, “IaaS”) is projected to grow 
from $23 billion in 2015 to $34 billion in 2018.136 Global spending on IaaS was 
projected to reach $16.5 billion in 2015, an increase of over 30% from 2014.137 
The benefits of cloud-based storage are clear. In a recent article, The Econ-
omist described cloud computing as “a business-critical issue,” enabling organ-
izations to avoid the problems associated with aging IT systems and “to better 
position themselves to sell and compete on global platforms.”138 It not only 
provides portability, but it allows for more seamless upgrades and transitions 
to new or multiple devices, because content does not need to be laboriously 
copied from one device to another. In addition, taking advantage of economies 
of scale, storage of data can be more secure than storage on local servers.139 
While a user practically and intuitively understands the benefits of cloud 
storage, the importance of fair use to this fast-growing ecosystem, is less clear. 
An understanding of fair use, however, quickly illuminates why it is funda-
mental to cloud computing. Put simply, fair use allows a user to copy and send 
a copyrighted work, if done so for personal purposes or other limited uses, 
without prior authorization of the copyright owner.140 Imagine a world where a 
user who stores her music library remotely would need to obtain consent from 
each music file’s copyright owner prior to streaming a single song. Significant-
ly, because of judicially developed theories of secondary liability, the cloud 
computing service without fair use very well could determine it needed to dis-
able copying and sharing features for third-party content.141 Because copying is 
unavoidable in the cloud ecosystem (i.e., copies of a work must be made to 
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move or stream it),142 cloud technologies without fair use would come to a 
grinding halt. 
Again, a cloud technology company operating in a jurisdiction lacking a fair 
use principle must weigh the potential of litigation before innovating and 
bringing a product or service to market. Without a flexible fair use standard, 
technology companies in most jurisdictions must rely on a regulatory or legis-
lative body to approve specific uses or technologies. In Europe, for example, 
Article 5(2)(b) of the Copyright Directive allows for limited sharing of copy-
righted works but only if the rights holders receive “fair compensation.”143 
Such compensation typically manifests itself through the form of a tax on the 
products and services that facilitate copying.144 
C. Section 230 of the Communications Decency Act 
The Internet as it exists today would not be possible without Section 230 of 
the Communications Decency Act (“CDA”).145 Section 230 generally protects 
Internet companies from civil liability under federal and state law for content 
provided by a third person.146 Specifically, Section 230(c)(1) states: 
No provider or user of an interactive computer service shall be treated as the publisher 
or speaker of any information provided by another information content provider.147 
Therefore, a defendant would be immune from state law liability under the 
Act if: 
(1) [I]t is a “provider or user of an interactive computer service”; (2) the complaint 
seeks to hold the defendant liable as a “publisher or speaker”; and (3) the action is 
based on “information provided by another information content provider.”148 
Section 230 was adopted in response several cases, including Stratton Oak-
mont, Inc. v. Prodigy Servs. Co, in which the court treated the Internet compa-
ny as a publisher of content developed by a third party user of the Internet 
company’s platform.149 At the time of the decision, Prodigy’s site received 
60,000 postings a day—far too many to review in their entirety.150 The court 
imposed potential liability on Prodigy for all posts.151 
In Section 230, Congress created an important precedent in Internet policy 
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 143 Directive 2001/29/EC, supra note 126, art. 5, ¶ 2(b). 
 144 Id. Pmbl. ¶¶ 35-36, 38. 
 145 Communications Decency Act § 230. 
 146 Id. § 230(c)(2). 
 147 Id. § 230(c)(1). 
 148 Shiamili v. Real Estate Grp. of N.Y., 952 N.E.2d 1011, 1015 (N.Y. Ct. App. 2011). 
 149 See Stratton Oakmont Inc. v. Prodigy Serv. Co., 1995 WL 323710 at *5 (S.C.N.Y. 
1995), superseded by statute as stated in Shiamili, 952 N.E.2d at 1011. 
 150 Stratton Oakmont, 1995 WL 323710 at *3. 
 151 Id. 
336 THE CATHOLIC UNIVERSITY [Vol. 24.2 
JOURNAL OF LAW & TECHNOLOGY 
that has endured for 20 years. Legislators decided to refrain from holding In-
ternet companies liable for the conduct of third parties who use their platforms 
in order to promote innovation by Internet companies and to ensure that the 
Internet would continue to grow.152 Congress recognized that the scale of the 
Internet would make it impossible for Internet companies to police their plat-
forms or pre-screen user activity and that the potential of such liability under 
traditional concepts of publisher liability would create a perverse incentive for 
an Internet company to avoid acquiring knowledge of potentially unlawful ac-
tivity. By eliminating such liability, Congress chose instead to incentivize 
companies to respond to notices of potentially unlawful or unsavory activity. 
Section 230 provides four exceptions to its limitations on liability.153 Section 
230 does not provide immunity for violations of federal criminal law, limit or 
expand intellectual property law, prevent consistent State law actions, or limit 
Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986.154 Courts have interpreted 
Section 230 broadly. In the seminal case interpreting this provision, Zeran v. 
Am. Online, Inc.,155 the court explained: 
Faced with potential liability for each message republished by their services, interac-
tive computer service providers might choose to severely restrict the number and type 
of messages posted. Congress considered the weight of the speech interests implicated 
and chose to immunize service providers to avoid any such restrictive effect.156 
The Court also recognized Section 230’s complimentary purpose: by im-
munizing service providers from liability based on content posted on their 
sites, Section 230 also removes the incentive for providers not to edit their sites 
for fear of potential liability as a “publisher.”157 In that case, the court held that 
AOL was “plainly immune. . . from liability for information that originates 
with third parties that was posted on its site.158 After Zeran established that 
service providers are generally immune from liability under Section 230, other 
courts followed, resounding support for the protections Section 230 provides. 
In particular, courts recognize the scale of the Internet renders it impossible for 
a service provider, particularly small companies or nascent services, to police 
the Internet: 
[S]creening, though lawful, is hard. Simple filters along the lines of “postings may not 
contain the words ‘white’” can’t work. Statements such as “red brick house with white 
trim” do not violate any law, and prospective buyers and renters would be worse off if 
                                                 
 152 CDA 230: Legislative History, ELEC. FRONTIER FOUND., http://bit.ly/1SVViR4 (last 
visited Feb. 7, 2016). 
 153 Communications Decency Act § 230(e). 
 154 Id. 
 155 Zeran v. Am. Online, Inc., 129 F.3d 327 (4th Cir. 1997). 
 156 Id. at 331. 
 157 Id. 
 158 Id. at 328. 
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craigslist blocked descriptive statements. An online service could hire a staff to vet the 
postings, but that would be expensive and may well be futile: if postings had to be re-
viewed before being put online, long delay could make the service much less useful, 
and if the vetting came only after the material was online the buyers and sellers might 
already have made their deals. Every month more than 30 million notices are posted 
to the craigslist system . . . . It would be necessary to increase that staff (and the ex-
pense that users must bear) substantially to conduct the sort of editorial review that the 
[plaintiff] demands—and even then errors would be frequent . . . Automated filters 
and human reviewers may be equally poor at sifting good from bad postings unless 
the discrimination is blatant; both false positives and false negatives are inevitable.159
  
While courts have generally ruled in favor of ISP immunity, some courts 
have also begun to question such blanket immunity in certain cases.160 The 
Ninth Circuit clarified that a service provider was not immune from liability 
where a website operator developed the content selected by a user of the web-
site’s platform.161 
There have been over 184 cases involving Section 230 since 1996.162 A vast 
majority of those cases have found that Internet companies are immune from 
liability consistent with the Fourth Circuit’s holding in Zeran.163 By now, near-
ly every single Circuit has considered Section 230, and interpreted it as provid-
ing broad protections for service providers, consistent with Zeran’s first inter-
pretations.164 
                                                 
 159 Chi. Lawyers’ Comm. for Civ. Rts. Under Law, Inc. v. Craigslist, Inc., 519 F.3d 666, 
668-69 (7th Cir. 2008), as amended (May 2, 2008). 
 160 See Fair Hous. Council of San Fernando Valley v. Roommates.Com, LLC, 521 F.3d 
1157, 1164 (9th Cir. 2008) (“The Communications Decency Act was not meant to create a 
lawless no-man’s-land on the Internet.”) 
 161 See id. at 1165-66 (holding CDA did not immunize website for induced third parties 
to express illegal preferences on its website by posting a questionnaire and displaying its 
answers on its site). 
 162 David S. Ardia, Free Speech Savior or Shield for Scoundrels: An Empirical Study of 
Intermediary Immunity Under Section 230 of the Communications Decency Act, 43 LOY. 
L.A. L. REV. 373, 448 tbl.8 (2010). 
 163 See, e.g., Almeida v. Amazon.com, Inc., 456 F.3d 1316, 1321 (11th Cir. 2006) (“The 
majority of federal circuits have interpreted the CDA to establish broad ‘federal immunity to 
any cause of action that would make service providers liable for information originating 
with a third-party user of the service.’” (quoting Zeran, 129 F.3d at 331)); Carafano v. 
Metrosplash.com, Inc., 339 F.3d 1119, 1124-25 (9th Cir. 2003). Courts have even extended 
their reading of Section 230 to bar claims for injunctive relief against service providers.  See 
generally Ben Ezra, Weinstein, & Co. v. Am. Online Inc., 206 F.3d 980, 983–86 (10th Cir. 
2000) (holding that section 230 immunized a computer service provider from a suit for 
damages and injunctive relief); see also generally Doe v. America Online Inc., 783 So.2d 
1010, 1013-17 (Fla. 2001). “We specifically concur [with Zeran] that section 230 expressly 
bars ‘any actions’ and we are compelled to give the language of this preemptive law its plain 
meaning.” Id. at 1018. 
 164 All of the following cases held service operators qualified for immunity under Sec-
tion 230. See, e.g., Universal Commc’ns Sys., Inc. v. Lycos, Inc., 478 F.3d 413, 422 (1st 
Cir. 2007); Ricci v. Teamsters Union Local 456¸781 F.3d 25, 28 (2d Cir. 2015); DiMeo v. 
Max, 248 Fed.Appx. 280, 282 (3rd Cir. 2007); Westlake Legal Grp. v. Yelp, Inc., 599 
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In just one second online, Internet users send over 2.4 million emails, view 
over 100,000 YouTube videos, and generate over 50,000 Google searches, 
7,000 tweets, 1,100 Tumblr posts, and 700 Instagram photos.165 It is clearly 
impossible to monitor all activity online. Without the protections of Section 
230, many if not most of these companies would not exist. 
D. Digital Millennium Copyright Act of 1998 
The Digital Millennium Copyright Act (“DMCA”) limits the remedies 
available against online intermediaries based on the activities of their users.166 
President Clinton signed the DMCA into law in 1998 and contains five opera-
ble titles: 
 Title I-WIPO Treaties Implementation 
 Title II-Online Copyright Infringement Liability Limitation 
 Title III-Computer Maintenance or Repair Copyright Exemption 
 Title IV-Miscellaneous Provisions 
 Title V-Protection of Certain Original Designs167 
Title I of the DMCA updates U.S. copyright law in order to comply with the 
WIPO Copyright Treaty (“WCT”) and the WIPO Performances and Phono-
grams Treaty (“WPPT”), which was adopted at the WIPO Diplomatic Confer-
ence in December 1996 (“WIPO Treaty”).168 
Title II of the DMCA, the Online Copyright Infringement Liability Limita-
tion Act, provides critical protection for Internet companies.169 Specifically, 
Title II provides online service providers with a safe harbor from liability for 
copyright infringement, so long as the providers comply with certain obliga-
tions.170 The safe harbor applies to Internet companies that host, link to, or pro-
vide access to content on the Internet and to four categories of conduct by the-
se companies: transitory communications, system caching, storage of infor-
mation on systems or networks at the direction of users, and information loca-
                                                                                                                 
Fed.Appx. 481, 485 (4th Cir. 2015); Doe v. MySpace, 528 F.3d 413, 422 (5th Cir. 2008); 
Jones v. Dirty World Entm’t Recordings LLC, 755 F.3d 398, 417 (6th Cir. 2014); Doe v. 
GTE Corp., 347 F.3d 655, 660 (7th Cir. 2003); Johnson v. Arden, 614 F.3d 785, 792 (8th 
Cir. 2010); Batzel v. Smith, 333 F.3d 1018, 1031 (9th Cir. 2008); Ezra & Co., 206 F.3d at 
986; Almeida, 456 F.3d at 132; Klayman v. Zuckerberg, 753 F.2d 1354, 1357-59 (D.C. Cir. 
2014). 
 165 In 1 Second, INTERNET LIVE STATS, http://bit.ly/1Sj5QVX (last visited Apr. 10, 2016). 
 166 Digital Millennium Copyright Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-304, 112 Stat. 2860 
(1998) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 17 U.S.C.). 
 167 Id. 
 168 Id. §§ 101-105. 
 169 Id. §§ 201-203. 
 170 Copyright Act § 512. 
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tion tools.171 A party must be a ‘service provider’ to qualify for a safe harbor.172 
The safe harbor for transitory communications requires the provider to be “an 
entity offering the transmission, routing, or providing of connections for digital 
online communications, between or among points specified by a user, of mate-
rial of the user’s choosing, without modification to the content of the material 
as sent or received.”173  The safe harbors for caching, user-directed storage, and 
information location tools require only that a party be “a provider of online 
services or network access, or the operator of facilities therefor…”174 To be 
eligible for the safe harbor, the service provider must fulfill two other obliga-
tions: (1) adopt and reasonably implement a policy of terminating the accounts 
of subscribers who are repeated infringers and (2) “accommodates and does 
not interfere with standard technical measures.”175 These ‘measures’ do not 
impose an affirmative duty on service providers to monitor its site or seek in-
formation about copyright infringement on its service. 
After meeting these baseline obligations, the service provider must comply 
with the DMCA’s notice-and-take-down provisions.176 These provisions af-
fords copyright owners the opportunity to notify a service provider of allegedly 
infringing material on the provider’s site or system, and requires the provider 
to remove or block access to the infringing material.177 The service provider 
must designate an agent for receiving and processing notices from copyright 
owners to the Copyright Office and on its service.178 The agent must be clearly 
designated to the Copyright Office and on its service.179 The Act exempts pro-
viders from liability if a provider, in good faith, removes or blocks access to 
material after receiving a notice of alleged infringement or after becoming 
aware of infringing material.180 
The adoption of the DMCA’s safe harbors were critical to the growth of the 
                                                 
 171 Id. “Information location tools” generally cover service provider referral to material 
at other websites through a search engine, list of recommended sites, or a hypertext link. Id. 
§ 512(d). 
 172 Id. § 512(a). 
 173 Id. § 512(k)(1)(A). 
 174 Id. § 512(k)(1)(B). 
 175 Id. § 512(i)(1)(A)-(B). Standard technical measures are defined as measures that cop-
yright owners use “to identify or protect copyrighted works [that] (A) have been developed 
pursuant to a broad consensus of copyright owners and service providers in an open, fair and 
voluntary multi-industry process, (B) are available to anyone on reasonable nondiscrimina-
tory terms; and (C) do not impose substantial costs or burdens on service providers.” Id. § 
512(i)(2)(A)-(C). These may include digital watermarks or other technological means of 
preventing copying of a work. See id. 
 176 Copyright Act § 512(j)(3). 
 177 Id. § 512(g)(2)(A). 
 178 Id. § 512(c)(2). 
 179 Id. 
 180 Id. § 512(g)(1). The material that is the subject of the notice must fall within one of 
the four activities provided by the act. Id. § 512(g)(4). 
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Internet. Copyright is a strict liability regime with a unique statutory damages 
component and a judicially developed secondary liability construction.181 Ab-
sent safe harbors that limit liability for service providers, this framework 
would result in astronomical claims for statutory damages against Internet 
companies for performing the very functions that enable the Internet to exist. 
The combination of copyright’s strict liability provisions and the massive 
scale of the Internet have the potential to significantly chill innovation, infor-
mation sharing, and the development of the Internet. Today, there are well over 
1 billion websites online, and over three billion people in the world using the 
Internet—and potentially posting, sharing, or creating content or software that 
violates copyright law.182 It is impossible for an Internet company to proactive-
ly “police the Internet” for infringing activity on its platform.183 That is, it is 
difficult - if not impossible - for a third party to know in most instances wheth-
er any particular distribution of a work is infringing, whether the distribution is 
a fair use, whether the sender has a license, or even who owns the copyright. 
Crucially, the DMCA adopted the policy decision made by Congress in Sec-
tion 230, which is that Internet companies should not be required to police the 
Internet or be liable for third party actions.184 Unlike Section 230, the DMCA 
requires Internet companies to respond to notices from rights holders of poten-
tially infringing activity.185 
The notice-and-take down procedure strikes the right balance by providing a 
way for rights holders to protect their works and a reasonable way for Internet 
companies to assist rights holders in doing so.186 The provision places respon-
sibility for resolving disputes on the owner of the work, and the person who 
displayed, posted, or sent it without the owner’s permission.187 The DMCA 
immunizes Internet companies if they promptly remove potentially infringing 
                                                 
 181 See generally Kent Sinclair Jr., Liability for Copyright Infringement – Handling In-
nocence in a Strict Liability Context, 58 CAL. L. REV. 940, 941-61 (1970). 
 182 Total Number of Websites, supra note 26. 
 183 See generally Jonathan Schulman, Liability of Internet Service Providers for Infring-
ing Activities of their Customers: Will the Induce Act Solve the Problem?, 13 U. BALT. IN-
TELL. PROP. L.J. 121, 121 (2005) (“To address the growing concern of copyright infringe-
ment, the courts have decided several landmark cases in the past twenty years; however, no 
Congressional law or decision by the courts has stopped the illegal distribution of copy-
righted materials.”). 
 184 Communications Decency Act § 230(a). 
 185 Copyright Act § 512(c)(1). 
 186 If the subscriber serves a counter notification complying with statutory requirements, 
including a statement under penalty of perjury that the material was removed or disabled 
through mistake or misidentification, then the Internet company must put the material back 
up within 10-14 business days after receiving the counter notification, unless the copyright 
owner files an action seeking a court order against the subscriber. Id. § 512(c)(3). 
 187 Id. § 512. 
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works after receiving a takedown notice.188 The Internet companies would also 
have to promptly notify the subscriber once the material has been removed or 
access disabled.189 In which case, if there is a dispute, the Internet company is 
not in the middle of it—the owner of the work may file an action against the 
subscriber who posted the material, and the subscriber may seek a penalty 
against the owner for knowing material misrepresentations in the notice to the 
Internet company.190 Again, Congress declined to make the Internet company 
the arbiter of what is or is not lawful activity in the ether. 
The bottom line is that the DMCA provides Internet companies, and the 
venture capitalists that fund start-ups, with all-important certainty that as long 
as they comply with fairly simple obligations, they can operate without fear of 
litigation. The obligations do not require any great degree of internal legal so-
phistication, allowing a start-up to launch without the need for in-house law-
yers.191 But even the smallest start-up knows that it must put in place a process 
to comply with DMCA obligations. It is impossible to overstate the DMCA 
safe harbor’s importance to the Internet. Former YouTube General Counsel 
Zahavah Levine stated, “[w]ithout this safe harbor, sites like YouTube could 
not exist.”192 
III. U.S. TRADE POLICY NEEDS TO BE UPDATED TO REFLECT 
TODAY’S INTERNET ECONOMY  
In today’s globally-oriented competitive business landscape, U.S. trade poli-
cy does not fully export the laws that make it possible for U.S. Internet compa-
nies to succeed abroad. Rather, trade policy still largely reflects the priorities 
of a pre-Internet era. Of the few laws that make the Internet work, USTR has 
only successfully incorporated the safe harbors of the DMCA into trade 
agreements.193 USTR incorporated a fair use-like provision into trade negotia-
tions only three years ago, and this provision has been included in the proposed 
TPP—which awaits ratification by the Senate.194 Section 230 and First 
Amendment-like protections have yet to become trade objectives. The failure 
to incorporate half of the legal framework (and if the TPP is not adopted, three-
                                                 
 188 Id. § 512(c). 
 189 Id. § 512(g)(1). 
 190 U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE, THE DIGITAL MILLENNIUM COPYRIGHT ACT 12 (1998), 
http://bit.ly/DMCApdf. 
 191 See generally id. 
 192 David Kravetz, 10 Years Later, Misunderstood DMCA is the Law That Saved the 
Web, WIRED (Oct. 27, 2008, 3:01 PM), http://bit.ly/1rgxInf. 
 193 CABINET SECRETARIAT OF JAPAN, TRANS-PACIFIC PARTNERSHIP AGREEMENT SUM-
MARY 10 (2015) http://bit.ly/1XHm7Yq. 
 194 Margot E. Kaminski, The Capture of International Intellectual Property Law 
Through the U.S. Trade Regime, 87 S. CAL. L. REV. 977, 1027-28 (2014). 
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quarters of the framework) that makes the Internet work impairs U.S. compa-
nies’ global competitiveness.195 
The primary trade authorities in the U.S. lack sufficient high-ranking offi-
cials and inter-agency groups dedicated to promoting the Internet and access to 
information access policy.196 The administration has some trade-focused offic-
es—such as the International Trade Administration (“ITA”)—that seem to ad-
dress telecommunications and information technologies, however, these enti-
ties are not primarily focused on the four basic laws that make the Internet 
work.197 For instance, the Department of Commerce’s ITA divisions on e-
commerce, information, and telecommunications do not report on intermediary 
liability, information access barriers, or many of the key priorities of today’s 
Internet industry.198 The latest available e-commerce “tool kit” and telecom-
munications statistics reports on the division’s site are from 2011.199 And while 
Congress oversees trade, it has not focused on prioritizing the interests of In-
ternet companies. 
Not surprisingly, the administration’s institutional priority relative to pro-
moting the Internet is reflected in USTR’s current trade priorities and in the 
recently negotiated trade agreements themselves. When trade agreements do 
discuss the Internet, it is most often mentioned in the context of promoting 
strong intellectual property (“IP”) enforcement related to pirated software, 
                                                 
 195 The international nature of the Internet renders companies vulnerable to liability in 
markets that have not recognized the benefits of a balanced IP regime for online content.  
Several jurisdictions have declined to adopt liability limitations for online service providers 
similar to those available in the U.S.  For example, France, Italy, and Germany have im-
posed fines or harsh requirements on websites for allowing access to certain information or 
content.  See Ruling on Nazi Memorabilia Sparks Legal Debate, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 24, 
2000), http://nyti.ms/1NkGiL9; Landgericht Hamburg (LG), Sept. 26, 2008, 308 O 42/06, 
http://bit.ly/308O4206; Giulio Coraggio, Yahoo! Liable for Searchable Contents!, IPT ITA-
LY (May 28, 2011), http://bit.ly/1XHmd28. 
 196 Cf. Cameron Kerry & Christopher Schroeder, White House Council Launches Inter-
agency Subcommittee on Privacy & Internet Policy (Oct. 24, 2010, 10:10 PM), 
http://1.usa.gov/23IELWH (discussing one interagency subcommittee created in 2010 to 
promote the Internet and information access). 
 197 See About the International Trade Administration, INT’L TRADE ADMIN., 
http://1.usa.gov/1Sj6frg (last visited Apr. 12, 2016) (“The International Trade Administra-
tion, U.S. Department of Commerce, manages this global trade site to provide access to ITA 
information on promoting trade investment, strengthening the competitiveness of U.S. in-
dustry, and ensuring fair trade and compliance with trade laws and agreements.”). 
 198 See Research by Industry/Sector: Internet and E-commerce Technologies, OFFICE OF 
TECH. & ELEC. COMMERCE, http://1.usa.gov/1ruSAqQ (last visited Apr. 12, 2016). 
 199 See generally Telecommunications Equipment Trade Statistics, OFFICE OF TECH. & 
ELEC. COMMERCE, http://1.usa.gov/1qD0tJH (last updated Sept. 18, 2012); see also general-
ly KEN WALSH, DEPT. OF COMMERCE, PREPARING YOUR BUSINESS FOR GLOBAL E-COMMERCE 
1 (2011), http://1.usa.gov/1rqwXrD. 
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trademark infringement, and cybersecurity.200 While these are important priori-
ties, they say nothing of the need to promote access to and use of the near-
limitless resources the Internet provides. In May 2015, USTR Robert Holley-
man II laudably promoted policies “to ensure the Internet remains open, free, 
and a platform for global innovation,” but USTR advocacy did not address 
these objectives before this moment.201 This was the first time we are aware of 
a trade official making such a case. 
Consequently, we propose that Congress create trade ambassadors for the 
Internet and for access to information. Congress and the administration should 
create trade offices that promote the Internet and the laws that make it work. 
And, USTR should create additional Industry Trade Advisory Committees 
(“ITACs”) to support the Internet and access to information. The current 
asymmetry in U.S. trade policy will only persist if the organizational structure 
in the U.S. continue to focus on outdated issues unless structural changes of 
this kind are made. 
A. History of Copyright in U.S. Trade Agreements 
With its passage of the DMCA in 1998, the U.S. took a vital step toward 
opening new revenue streams and markets by providing certain rules of the 
road for the Internet.202 The DMCA has been critical law for Internet compa-
nies and has exemplified the benefits of incorporating exceptions and limita-
tions to balance strong IP protections.203 
Only over the last twenty years or so has the U.S. used trade agreements to 
advance interests beyond pure import and export goals. Beginning with its ac-
cession to the Berne Convention in 1988, the U.S. began to recognize the im-
portance of IP protections in trade policy.204 But U.S. adherence to the Berne 
convention was only a small step forward. Berne was not self-executing under 
U.S. law, meaning that domestic copyright principles were not exported, and 
                                                 
 200 See, e.g., United States–Australia Free Trade Agreement art. 17.3, ¶ 1, U.S.-Austl., 
Jan. 1, 2005 [hereinafter Australia FTA], http://bit.ly/AUSFTA (requiring trademark dispute 
settlement procedure for domain names); United States–Colombia Trade Promotion Agree-
ment art. 16.4, ¶ 1, U.S.-Col., May 15, 2012 [hereinafter Colombia TPA], 
http://bit.ly/ColTPA (requiring trademark dispute settlement procedure for domain names). 
 201 See Holleyman NDN Address, supra note 58. 
 202 LILIAN EDWARDS, ROLE AND RESPONSIBILITY OF INTERNET INTERMEDIARIES IN THE 
FIELD OF COPYRIGHT AND RELATED RIGHTS 12-14 (2010), http://bit.ly/23W94JN. 
 203 Priyambada Mishra & Angsuman Dutta, Striking a Balance between Liability of In-
ternet Service Providers and Protection of Copyright over the Internet: A Need of the Hour, 
14 J. INTELL. PROP. RIGHTS 321, 326 (2009). 
 204 The Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works, Sept. 9, 
1886, as last revised July 24, 1971, amended Oct. 2, 1979, S. Treaty Doc. No. 99-27, 828 
U.N.T.S. 221, 102 Stat. 2853 (1979). 
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copyright disputes would be resolved under domestic law.205 Shortly after, the 
Agreement on Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) 
was signed in Morocco in 1994, and it aimed to promote uniformity in the way 
IP rights are protected around the world.206 It established minimum levels of 
protection that each government must give to fellow World Trade Organization 
(“WTO”) members.207 The creation of the WTO at the Uruguay Round of Mul-
tilateral Trade Negotiations in 1995 and the passage of the TRIPS agreement 
secured the link between copyright principles and trade negotiations.208 In addi-
tion, mandating ratification of TRIPS established the priority of legal parity on 
IP principles among nations.209 These two events helped the framework for 
exporting the IP principles of the U.S. overseas.210 
The United States has been vigorous in its promotion of strong IP protec-
tions through trade.211 However, the U.S. has exported an asymmetrical copy-
right regime that does not fully reflect the balance found in U.S. law. By focus-
ing only on enforcement, protection, and prevention of illegitimate uses, Con-
gress has given an excuse for other countries to engage in protectionist prose-
cutions against U.S. Internet companies for activity that is legal under U.S. 
law.212 
Over the past decade or so, USTR has made small, but important, steps to-
ward promoting more Internet-friendly priorities, including IP policies that 
provide the flexibility necessary for a balanced regime. In addition to the 
DMCA, the USTR recently promoted fair use-like language in the TPP negoti-
                                                 
 205 Id. 
 206 Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Apr. 15, 1994, 
Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1C, 1869 
U.N.T.S. 299, 33 I.L.M. 1197 (1994) [hereinafter TRIPS Agreement] (“Desiring to reduce 
distortions and impediments to international trade, and taking into account the need to pro-
mote effective and adequate protection of intellectual property rights, and to ensure that 
measures and procedures to enforce intellectual property rights do not themselves become 
barriers to legitimate trade…”). 
 207 Id. art. 4. 
 208 See e.g., Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Apr. 15, 
1994, Final Act Embodying the Results of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade Negoti-
ations, 1867 U.N.T.S. 14, 33 I.L.M. 1143 (1994); TRIPS Agreement, supra note 205, arts. 
9-15, 69. 
 209 Clarisa Long, TRIPs and Intellectual Property Protection in Emerging Markets, 1 
INTELL. PROP. PRAC. GROUP. NEWSL., Fall 1997, http://bit.ly/1NzSZws. 
 210 See Andrew Christie, Sophie Waller, & Kimerlee Weatherall, Exporting the DMCA 
Through Free Trade Agreements, in INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY & FREE TRADE AGREEMENTS 
211, 211 (Christopher Heath & Anselm Kamperman Sanders eds., 2007); WORLD TRADE 
ORG., THE WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION…IN BRIEF 6 (2014). 
 211 Peter Drahos, Global Property Rights in Information: The Story of TRIPS at the 
GATT, 13 PROMETHEUS 6, 7-8 (1995). 
 212 Anne Hiaring, What’s New in the Neighborhood - The Export of the DMCA in Post-
TRIPS FTAs, 11 ANN. SURV. INT’L & COMP. L. 171, 172 (2005). 
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ations.213 
The DMCA was first added to the template for U.S. free trade agreements in 
2003.214 DMCA-like provisions were included in the Chile FTA.215 These pro-
visions allowed Chile to choose how to implement the relevant ban in its copy-
right liability regime, and apply to a slightly narrower category of uses.216 
Around the same time, the U.S. concluded FTAs with Singapore and Australia, 
that included provisions more closely resembling the DMCA.217 The incorpora-
tion of DMCA principles provides an important protection for Internet compa-
nies; it was a significant first step toward amending trade policies to promote a 
more balanced system that accounted for not only the interests of rights hold-
ers, but of Internet companies and user communities. By negotiating FTAs 
with IP chapters containing DMCA provisions, the U.S. has provided increased 
assurance to Internet companies that their business in foreign countries will be 
protected.218 Internet companies are prone to liability risks as they enter new 
markets and place servers and personnel in new jurisdictions.219 
The United States began exporting the DMCA through trade agreements in 
2003.220 Between 2003 and 2007, the U.S. concluded free trade agreements 
with 16 countries.221 Over that time, there has been a marked increase in the 
length, and technical detail, of chapters focused on IP compared to earlier trade 
agreements.222 The anti-circumvention provisions of the DMCA have received 
a particularly increased amount of attention in recent years.223 
                                                 
 213 USTR Introduces New Copyright Exceptions and Limitations Provision at San Diego 
TPP Talks, TRADEWINDS. (July 3, 2012) [hereinafter USTR Introduces New Exceptions], 
http://1.usa.gov/1NkGkCP. 
 214 Hiaring, supra note 212, at 174; United States-Singapore Free Trade Agreement art. 
16.4, ¶ 7, U.S.-Sing., May 6, 2003 [hereinafter Singapore FTA], http://bit.ly/SingFTA. 
 215 See United States-Chile Free Trade Agreement art. 17.7, ¶ 5, U.S.-Chile, June 6, 2003 
[hereinafter Chile FTA], http://bit.ly/ChileFTA. 
 216 See id. art. 17.7, ¶ 5. 
 217 See Singapore FTA, supra note 214, art. 16.4, ¶ 7; Australia FTA, supra note 200, art. 
17.4, ¶ 7. 
 218 OFFICE OF U.S. TRADE REP., 2004 SPECIAL 301 REPORT 5 (2004), 
http://bit.ly/04SP301. 
 219 ALI STERNBURG & MATT SCHRUERS, COMP. & COMMC’N INDUS. ASS’N, MODERNIZING 
LIABILITY RULES TO PROMOTE INTERNET TRADE 5 (2014) (“Internet companies are being 
forced to choose between forsaking foreign markets completely, thereby denying local users 
the benefits of Internet services and Internet-enabled commerce; or abandoning legal, inno-
vative, and profitable practices due to pervasive legal uncertainty.”). 
 220 Christie, Waller & Weatherall, supra note 210, at 215; see supra notes 214-217. 
 221 See id. at 212 n.4. 
 222 Id. at 213-14. 
 223 See, e.g., Parker Higgins, EFF to Congress: Get Rid of DMCA’s “Anti-
Circumvention” Provisions, ELEC. FRONTIER FOUND. (Sept. 17, 2014), 
http://bit.ly/1VCb4BH (“In recent years, concerns about the anti-circumvention provisions 
have hit the mainstream, as cell phone users realized that something as simple as unlocking 
their device to use a rival carrier could get them threatened with a crime.”). 
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IP chapters in trade agreements have increased in detail and complexity over 
the years as countries have tailored the broader treaty language to embody their 
stance on IP—usually in the direction of stricter enforcement regimes.225 Gen-
erally, the U.S. has been successful in exporting the DMCA almost verbatim as 
the way that WTO member countries implement the anti-circumvention provi-
sions required by the WIPO copyright treaty.226 The tendency for countries to 
add provisions that more strictly and specifically limit certain uses or technol-
ogies is indicative of the asymmetry in U.S. trade policy, and it shows the need 
for the U.S. to strengthen its export of Internet-friendly laws. 
Introducing fair use-like language is an important development for Internet 
companies. The U.S.-Korea Free Trade Agreement, (“KORUS”) completed 
and enacted in 2012, for the first time referenced fair use in a trade agree-
ment.227 It authorizes parties to provide exceptions and limitations to copyright 
protections—the provisions resembling fair use principles to be adopted in a 
trade agreement.228 KORUS provides in text: 
Each Party shall provide that authors, performers, and producers of phonograms have 
the right to authorize or prohibit all reproductions of their works, performances, and 
phonograms, in any manner or form, permanent or temporary (including temporary 
storage in electronic form).229 
In a footnote to the text, KORUS provides: 
Each Party shall confine limitations or exceptions to the rights described in paragraph 
1 to certain special cases that do not conflict with a normal exploitation of the work, 
performance, or phonogram, and do not unreasonably prejudice the legitimate inter-
ests of the right holder. For greater certainty, each Party may adopt or maintain limita-
tions or exceptions to the rights described in paragraph 1 for fair use, as long as any 
such limitation or exception is confined as stated in the previous sentence.230 
By providing that parties “may” adopt fair use provisions, KORUS uses 
permissive language to encourage acceptance of exceptions and limitations to 
copyright protections. While it may seem minor, this is an important step to-
                                                                                                                 
 224 See Christie, Waller & Weatherall, supra note 210, at 212 tbl.1. 
 225 Id. at 213; see also Beatrice Lindstrom, Scaling Back TRIPS-Plus: An Analysis of 
Intellectual Property Provisions in Trade Agreements and Implications For Asia And The 
Pacific, 42 INT’L L. & POL. 917, 963-64 (2010) (noting the Bush administration sought to 
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oping Countries in the Digital Economy, 20 SANTA CLARA COMP. & HIGH TECH. L.J. 941, 
960-62 (2003) (“The U.S. has clearly established the DMCA’s anti-circumvention measures 
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 227 See U.S.-Korea Free Trade Agreement art. 18.4 n.11, U.S.-Kor., Mar. 15, 2012 [here-
inafter KORUS], http://bit.ly/korusFTA (“[E]ach Party may adopt or maintain limitations or 
exceptions to the rights described in paragraph 1 for fair use . . .”). 
 228 Id. art. 18.4, ¶ 7(d). 
 229 Id. art. 18.4, ¶ 1. 
 230 Id. art. 18.4 n.11 (emphasis added). 
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ward including much-needed flexibility into trade agreements. 
The U.S. may be poised to take another step in this direction. The recently 
negotiated TPP contains a fair use-like provision, which USTR introduced, 
negotiated, and obtained from its trading partners.231 The provision would re-
quire nations to “seek to achieve an appropriate balance in their copyright sys-
tems in providing copyright exceptions and limitations for purposes such as 
criticism, comment, news reporting, teaching, scholarship, and research.”232 
The TPP, if ratified by the U.S. Senate, would impose an obligation on parties 
to adopt limitations and exceptions as part of its copyright framework: 
Each Party shall endeavor to achieve an appropriate balance in its copyright and relat-
ed rights system, inter alia by means of limitations or exceptions that are consistent 
with Article QQ.G.16.1, including those for the digital environment, giving due con-
sideration to legitimate purposes such as, but not limited to: criticism, comment, news 
reporting, teaching, scholarship, research, and other similar purposes; and facilitating 
access to [AU oppose: published] works for persons who are blind, visually impaired, 
or otherwise print [AU propose: or perceptually] disabled.233 
The draft consciously uses the word “shall” instead of “may.”234 By mandat-
ing parties to at least “endeavor to achieve” a more balanced copyright scheme, 
the TPP inches forward towards a more Internet-company friendly ecosystem 
necessary for businesses to thrive internationally.235 
Stakeholders have opposed exporting an IP policy through trade agreements. 
Particularly in recent years, industry members and even members of Congress 
pushed lawmakers not to incorporate fair use-like protections in the TPP.236 
These advocates oppose export of the fair use doctrine through trade agree-
ments.237 Consequently, USTR’s adoption of fair use-like language was institu-
tionally significant because it faced intense pressure not to adopt fair use. 
The decision to include fair-use like language represents a clear indication 
that the USTR is beginning to understand that more balanced IP policies must 
be included in trade agreements going forward. In addition, Congress also has 
made progress. While the 2007 TPA made no mention of limitations and ex-
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ceptions, the recently proposed TPA does: 
[T]his section reflects the view of the Committee that U.S. trade agreements should 
contain copyright provisions that provide adequate and effective protection for U.S. 
right holders as well as foster an appropriate balance in copyright systems, inter alia 
by means of limitations and exceptions consistent with the internationally recognized 
3-step test.238 
This directive is crucially stronger than USTR’s leaked text. In modifying 
the promotion of limitations and exceptions, Congress dropped the “endeavor 
to achieve” modifier. 
B. Today’s Trade Priorities 
The United States has taken steps toward reforming its trade bodies and pol-
icies to better reflect changing consumer needs and marketplace realities over 
the years. Yet, the structure and resource allocation within the primary trade 
offices in the U.S. demonstrate a clear gap in trade policy with regard to the 
Internet and access to information. 
At other points in U.S. trade history, Congress has acted to recalibrate trade 
policy to address imbalances in trade priorities. The passage of the Trade Act 
of 1974 is exemplary.239  Then, amidst a negative economic environment and 
disparate treatment of trade partners among countries, Congress was motivated 
by the need to “promote fairness and equity in the international trading system 
and to prevent a serious deterioration in the spirit of economic cooperation that 
is essential for the preservation of economic and political stability in a rapidly 
changing world.”240 It had been twelve years since Congress passed its most 
recent trade act in 1962, and the Senate recognized the global economic down-
turn at that time “ha[d] been unfavorable to this country, largely because of the 
antiquated rules of the international trade … systems and the related lack of 
genuine cooperation and reciprocity in international economic relations.”241 
Today, the U.S. is again at a crossroads where over twelve years have already 
passed since it substantially reviewed and renewed its trade policies.242 While 
the economic conditions are not as dire as they were in the early 1970s, U.S. 
Internet companies are facing protectionist attacks around the globe.243 And, 
                                                 
 238 S. REP. NO. 114-42, at 17 (2015). 
 239 Trade Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-618, 88 Stat. 1979 (1974); Kazimierz Grzybowski 
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 241 Id. at 15. 
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many of the Internet policies we take for granted in the U.S. have not been 
adopted by other countries.244 
Congress could adopt reforms to U.S. trade bodies and practices similar to 
those adopted as part of the 1974 Trade Act. First, Congress could establish an 
ambassador, an office, an ITAC, and a supporting data and analysis group for 
each major industry. Creating a clear, linear structure through which infor-
mation on each industry could flow would achieve greater efficiency and con-
sistency within and across agencies. Next, Congress should build upon perhaps 
the greatest reform implemented under the Act: establishment of the system of 
ITACs.245 
At the time, Congress regarded the multilateral trade negotiations to be con-
ducted under its legislation to be the “most comprehensive ever conducted” 
and determined “the need for the Government to seek information and advice 
from the private sector is more important than ever before.”246 Further, the 
Senate noted that private advisory groups would provide “policy and technical 
advice prior to, and throughout, the negotiations” and would issue formal re-
ports at the conclusion of agreements affecting their sectors, with an eye to-
ward the equity and mutuality achieved.247 In addition, the Act provided fast-
track authority to the executive branch with the purpose of facilitating “fair and 
equitable conditions of trade.”248 Finally, the Act empowered the U.S. Interna-
tional Trade Commission (USITC, the former U.S. Tariff Commission) to con-
duct renegotiation procedures, including public hearings and advisory reports 
to assess the probable economic effect of draft terms.249 Generally, the act re-
sulted in reduced overall trade barriers.250 Transparency and information was 
                                                                                                                 
cause it ‘Can’t Compete’, THE VERGE (Feb. 17, 2015, 7:06 AM), http://bit.ly/1A2ivXw. 
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the answer. 
These reforms have been considered successful. The ITAC system in partic-
ular has been lauded as useful in identifying market-opening opportunities, and 
the GAO recognized that the advisory committee system’s unique features 
“give it an important role in U.S. trade policy.” 251 Together, the reforms—in 
addition to others adopted under the act—resulted in an increase in trade from 
less than 5% of GDP in 1974 to nearly 10% of GDP for exports and nearly 
15% of GDP for imports in 2008.252 Trade share has tripled to 27% by 2010 
since 1970.253 
Similarly today, the TPA, TPP, and T-TIP agreements individually, and to-
gether, will have a substantial effect on the economy both in the U.S. and 
abroad. For 2016, President Obama has made international trade a significant 
focus—laying out “the most ambitious trade agenda in a generation”—in his 
efforts to conclude the TPP agreement and the T-TIP.254 Together, the partners 
to those agreements will make up a market that accounts for 85% of foreign 
direct investment, employs five million Americans, and buys 62% of U.S. ex-
ports.255 The agreements thus have the potential of increasing U.S. exports by 
more than $100 billion per year when implemented, which corresponds to sup-
porting between 5,400 to 5,900 jobs.256 
The stated objectives of these agreements are to establish transparency and 
consistency of the regulatory environments to enable businesses to operate 
across regions, support access to supplies and information, and promote inno-
vation.257 Again, in order to achieve these objectives, structural reforms to U.S. 
trade authorities are necessary. While the ITAC system established under the 
1974 Trade Act is still intact, it must be updated to reflect one of the most im-
portant economic sectors to today’s economies: the Internet. USTR could cre-
ate an ITAC for the Internet and an ITAC for Access to Information composed 
of Internet representatives and representatives of the information economy, 
including consumer groups. Next, Congress could appoint an Ambassador for 
Access to Information and an Ambassador for the Internet, who each will pro-
mote Internet-friendly laws. Additionally, creation of an Office of Information 
                                                 
 251 U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-02-876, INTERNATIONAL TRADE: ADVI-
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Access and the Internet (“OIAI”) would allow the Department of Commerce 
(“DoC”) to provide an affiliated office with access to the DoC’s resources. 
To the extent practicable, the balance of protections and exceptions provided 
by the free speech provisions, fair use, the DMCA, Section 230, as well as re-
lated policies, should be incorporated into future trade agreements. The U.S. 
will not succeed in advancing these legal and policy objectives, however, 
without support from and resources within trade authorities. Given the increas-
ingly vital role of the Internet to not just sales of online goods, but to global 
trade, democratic discourse, and innovation, U.S. trade authorities should dedi-
cate significantly greater resources to advancing trade policies that provide the 
legal certainty and symmetry necessary to promote information access and the 
Internet economy.  
IV. CURRENT U.S. TRADE AUTHORITY STRUCTURE 
The Office of the USTR has primary responsibility for a majority of U.S. 
trade policy.258 The head of the USTR, the U.S. Trade Representative, is a cab-
inet member and serves as the President’s principal trade advisor.259 About 30 
senior officials, who are lawyers and economists, support USTR.260 These in-
clude ambassadors, deputies, and assistant USTRs dedicated to specific policy 
objectives or industries.261 In FY2015, USTR reported 233 full-time equivalent 
employees and a budget of nearly $55 million.262 In addition, other executive 
branch agencies, particularly the DoC, as well as the private sector, NGOs and 
local governments contribute to the development of trade policy.263 
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The Trade Expansion Act of 1962 created an interagency trade policy mech-
anism to assist USTR with implementation of these responsibilities.265 The 
Trade Policy Review Group (“TPRG”) and the Trade Policy Staff Committee 
(“TPSC”) were established to create a consultative mechanism by which 
USTR would consult with other government agencies.266 The TPSC comprises 
of members from twenty Federal agencies and offices, and more than ninety 
subcommittees responsible for specialized areas.267 All decisions made by these 
organizations require consensus, and the Office of Policy Coordination advises 
USTR on how to resolve policy differences among the agencies.268 “The Office 
is also responsible for eliciting advice from the public on policy decisions and 
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negotiations through public hearings and Federal Register notices.”269 The 
TPSC reports to the TPRG, who in turn reports to the National Economic 
Council (“NEC”) chaired by the President.270 
USTR’s outside advisors include a system of Industry Trade Advisory 
Committees (“ITACs”).271 The system is managed under the Office of Inter-
governmental Affairs & Policy Engagement (IAPE), in cooperation with the 
Department of Agriculture, Commerce, Labor, and Environmental Protection 
Agency.272 The IAPE is also tasked as the state coordinator for the WTO and 
NAFTA.273 The Advisory Committees’ tasks are to provide information and 
advice regarding U.S. negotiating objectives and bargaining positions before 
entering into trade agreements, and on enforcement and compliance once the 
agreement has been entered.274 The system consists of 16 ITACs, totaling ap-
proximately hundreds of industry representatives.275 The committees are ap-
pointed either by USTR alone or in conjunction with other Cabinet officers.276 
Each committee is required to prepare an annual report on proposed trade 
agreements.277 
The ITAC system is arranged into three tiers consisting of the President’s 
Advisory Committee for Trade Policy and Negotiations (“ACTPN”), four spe-
cialized policy advisory committees, and twenty-two technical and sectoral 
advisory committees.278 The ACTPN is made up of forty-five members ap-
pointed by the President for two-year terms.279 The Intergovernmental Policy 
Advisory Committee (“IGPAC”) and one of the specialized policy commit-
tees—the Trade Advisory Committee on Africa (“TACA”)—are managed 
solely by the USTR.280 The USTR and the Department of Agriculture, Depart-
ment of Labor, and the Environmental Protection Agency jointly manage the 
other three specialized policy committees: the Agricultural Advisory Commit-
tee, Labor Advisory Committee, and Trade and Environmental Policy Commit-
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tee.281 
Additionally, the DoC supports the USTR.282 The Department is comprised 
of 12 bureaus and 47,000 employees.283 There is a dedicated bureau for Inter-
national Trade Administration (“ITA”).284 The ITA is organized into three 
business units that work together to strengthen the competitiveness of the US 
industry, promote trade and investment, and enforce fair trade and compliance 
with trade laws and agreements: Industry and Analysis; Enforcement and 
Compliance; and Global Markets.285 
The USTR also works substantially with Congress on trade issues, primarily 
with the House Committee on Ways and Means and the Senate Committee on 
Finance, and their respective subcommittees.286 In addition, five members from 
each chamber are appointed as official advisors on trade policy under statute.287 
A. Weaknesses of U.S. Trade Authority Structure 
Each trade body generally focuses on the same major industries.288 However, 
there is a marked lack of consistency in the way resources are allocated both 
within trade entities and across the various agencies that contribute to trade 
policy.289 Most trade bodies have a dedicated leader, office, advisory group, 
and industry analysis focus on the more traditional industries, like agriculture 
or labor.290 However, for many other industry sectors, the agency lacks a dedi-
cated high-ranking official, an office, advisory system or significant focus 
within the relevant industry analysis division.291 This potentially causes any 
number of issues: incomplete coverage of developments or new data in the 
industry; breakdown in communication within the agency; lack of private sec-
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tor perspective and expertise; or insufficient advocacy at the leadership level or 
to the public. Any one of these bottlenecks can leave certain objectives or in-
dustry issues under-represented or left out of trade policy. That is certainly the 
case with regard to the Internet economy. 
1. Office of the United States Trade Representative 
The USTR focuses its trade policy in fourteen primary issue areas: Agricul-
ture, 292 Economy and Trade,293 Environment,294 Government Procurement,295 
Industry and Manufacturing, 296 Intellectual Property,297 Labor,298 Preference 
Programs,299 Services and Investment,300 Small Business,301 Textiles and Ap-
parel,302 Trade and Development, 303 and Trade Organizations.304 
We recommend the appointment of Ambassadors for Information Access 
and for the Internet in order to bring the USTR’s trade priorities closer to 
alignment with the Internet age. Under the current framework, it is too easy for 
“innovation” to take a second-seat to “intellectual property.”305 Indeed, the 
stated mission of the USTR’s Office of Intellectual Property and Innovation 
(“IPN”) is promoting “strong intellectual property laws and effective enforce-
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ment worldwide.”306 Its reports detail progress in implementing IP policies un-
der its agreements, but predominantly focus on infringement and enforcement, 
only mentioning the Internet in the context of “piracy” and domain name regis-
try.307 The “key areas of work” for IPN include “implementation of trade policy 
in support of U.S. innovations,” but this is highlighted in the context of phar-
maceutical and medical technology industries.308 These practices exemplify the 
asymmetrical focus of U.S. IP policy in trade on protections rather than pro-
moting use and access and the failure of trade policy to include the Internet as 
a primary platform for innovation.309 
USTR’s organizational structure should also be reformed to better reflect the 
focus of its trade policy.310 While the Deputy USTR has jurisdiction over sev-
eral issue areas, it lacks a dedicated branch for over half of them.311 The USTR 
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as its central focus for trade policy.  For instance, USTR combines the “Industry & Manu-
facturing,” “Small Business,” and “Trade & Development” issues under the “Small Busi-
ness, Market Access and Industrial Competitiveness” leadership division.  As another ex-
ample, it is unclear which employees focus on “Preference Programs” or “Textiles & Ap-
parel” issues, as no leadership group appears dedicated to those areas.  As of summer 2015, 
USTR leadership was comprised as follows: Agriculture and Cultural Affairs: 1 Chief Agri-
cultural Negotiator (Ambassador), 1 Assistant US Trade Rep. 2 Deputy Assistant US Trade 
Rep., 6 Directors of Agricultural Affairs; Monitoring and Enforcement: 1 Assistant US 
Trade Rep, 2 Deputy Assistant US Trade Rep, 1 Senior Counsel for Dispute Settlement; 
Environment & Natural Resources: 1 Assistant US Trade Rep., 1 Deputy Assistant US 
Trade Rep., 2 Directors of International Environmental Pol., 1 Director of Natural Re-
sources Policy; Intellectual Property and Innovation: 1 Assistant US Trade Rep., 2 Deputy 
Assistant US Trade Rep., 2 Director of Intellectual Property and Innov.; Labor: 1 Assistant 
US Trade Rep., 2 Deputy Assistant US Trade Rep.; Services and Investment: 1  Assistant 
US Trade Rep., 3 Deputy Assistant US Trade Rep., 1 Director of Investment Affairs, 1 Di-
rector of Services and Investments, 3 Director of Trade Negotiations; Small Business, Mar-
ket Access and Industrial Competitiveness: 1 Assistant US Trade Rep., 3 Deputy Assistant 
US Trade Rep., 1 Director of Non-Tariff Barriers, 1 Director of Industry Trade Policy, 1 
Director of Market Access, 1 Director of Steel Trade Policy, 1 Director of Tariff Policy; 
Trade Policy and Economics: 1 Assistant US Trade Rep., 1 Deputy Assistant US Trade 
Rep., 1 Director of Policy Planning; WTO and Multilateral Affairs: 1 Assistant US Trade 
Rep., 1 Deputy Assistant US Trade Rep., 1 Senior Director for Technical Barriers, 1 Senior 
Director for WTO Accessions, 1 Senior Director for WTO Affairs, 1 Director of Customs 
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should undertake further reforms to unify the flow of work on issue areas from 
the research and analysis division all the way up through leadership. The dis-
jointed nature of the agency has likely contributed significantly to the disparate 
focus on various industries, and a reformed structure will prove to be more 
efficient. 
Current free trade agreements (FTAs) provide insight into the effects of or-
ganizational issues on the advancement of various trade policy objectives to 
USTR. The FTAs generally include more discussion and detail for those tradi-
tional sectors of the economy in which the U.S. has been involved in either 
import or export of products for decades.312 For example, FTAs dedicate by far 
the most pages to the finance and investment, and textiles and apparel indus-
tries: over 600 and nearly 300 pages, respectively.313 Textiles and related mate-
rials, like cotton, have also traditionally been a major trade item for the US. 314 
However, finance accounted for 7%—meriting significant focus in FTAs—
while textiles made up less than 1% of GDP in 2014.315 This disparate coverage 
indicates a failure of USTR to update its FTAs to reflect current economic real-
ities.316 Since textiles are one industry that lacks a coherent structure within 
USTR, inconsistencies in FTA coverage may be due to a weaknesses in organ-
ization and resource allocation within the USTR.317 
While the proportion of FTAs dedicated to these industries may not track 
GDP, it is clear that FTAs fall short in their coverage of Internet-related poli-
                                                                                                                 
Affairs, 1 Director of Customs  Subsidies, 1 Director of Trade Policy Reviews, 1 Director of 
Trade Remedies, 1 Director of WTO Affairs.  See FEDERAL YELLOW BOOK, EXECUTIVE 
OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT [EOP] 31-34 (2015). 
 312 See generally North American Free Trade Agreement chs. 3, 11, 13, 17, U.S.-Can.-
Mex., Jan. 1, 1994 [hereinafter NAFTA]. 
 313 Australia FTA, supra note 200, chs. 4, 11, 13; United States-Bahrain Free Trade 
Agreement chs. 3, 11, U.S.-Bahr., Sept. 14, 2004 [hereinafter Bahrain FTA], 
http://bit.ly/BahFTA; Dominican Republic-Central America Free Trade Agreement chs. 3, 
10, 12, U.S.-Dom. Rep.-Costa Rica-El Sal.-Guat.-Hond.-Nicar., Aug. 2, 2005 [hereinafter 
CAFTA-DR], http://bit.ly/CAFTADR; Chile FTA, supra note 214, chs. 4, 10, 12; Colombia 
TPA, supra note 200, chs. 3, 10, 12; KORUS, supra note 227, chs. 4, 11, 13; United States-
Morocco Free Trade Agreement, U.S.-Morocco, chs. 4, 10, 12, June 15, 2004 [hereinafter 
Morocco FTA], http://bit.ly/MorocFTA; United States-Oman Free Trade Agreement, U.S.-
Oman, chs. 3, 10, 12, Sept. 26, 2006 [hereinafter Oman FTA], http://bit.ly/OmanFTA; Pan-
ama-United States Trade Promotion Agreement, Pan.-U.S., chs. 4, 10, 12, June 28, 2007 
[hereinafter Panama TPA], http://bit.ly/PanamaTPA; United States-Peru Trade Promotion 
Agreement, U.S.-Peru, chs. 3, 10, 12, Apr. 12, 2006 [hereinafter Peru FTA], 
http://bit.ly/PeruFTA; Singapore FTA, supra note 214, chs. 5, 10, 15. 
 314 The Cotton Industry: Bloom Times, THE ECONOMIST, Jan. 20, 2011, at 42 (“Last year 
America produced 18.3m bales—each bale weighing 480lb, or 218kg—and exported more 
than 80% of them.”). 
 315 VALUE ADDED GDP DATA, supra note 56. 
 316 Holleyman NDN Address, supra note 58. 
 317 USTR Org. Chart, supra note 310. 
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cies.318 There is no industry category tracking the Internet economy specifically 
to include companies that facilitate e-commerce, entertainment, social net-
working, and other Internet sectors.319 Despite the clear importance of the In-
ternet to the U.S. GDP, only 28 pages of all FTA agreements together men-
tioned the Internet and did so without advancing the important policy objec-
tives that resulted in the success of the Internet economy to date.320 
Promoting values related to IP protections have received more attention in 
recent years.321 Since the finalization of the TRIPS Agreement in 1994 and the 
WIPO Copyright Treaties in 1996, FTAs have contained increasingly substan-
tial IP sections;322 IP chapters of at least 30 pages seem to be standard.323 But 
these agreements fail to adequately address policies that provide protections 
similar to those available under the First Amendment, fair use, and Section 
230.324 Clearly, IP trade policy has focused predominantly on copyright en-
forcement and anti-piracy provisions, while fair use-like language has yet to be 
updated into an agreement. 325 Whether as an industry or policy focus area, the 
USTR should promote predictable Internet liability rules to ensure the contin-
ued growth of the Internet and the industries it supports. 
Public advocacy by the USTR and USTR Ambassadors also shows the 
comparable lack of attention to the Internet or information access issues in cur-
rent trade priorities. In the years since the commercial adoption of the Internet, 
only two speeches by USTR have addressed the Internet.326 Only one of these 
meaningfully addressed the policy concerns relevant to the Internet today. 327 In 
                                                 
 318 The “information” industry alone accounted for 4.8% of GDP in 2014. This industry 
includes publishers, software, motion pictures, sound recordings, broadcasting and tele-
communications, data processing, Internet publishing, and other information services. 
Namely, the content that consumers increasingly access online. VALUE ADDED GDP DATA, 
supra note 56. 
 319 Holleyman NDN Address, supra note 58. 
 320 See, e.g., Australia FTA, supra note 200, ch.16; Bahrain FTA, supra note 313, ch.13; 
CAFTA-DR, supra note 313, ch.14; Chile FTA, supra note 214, ch.15; Colombia FTA, 
supra note 200, ch.15; KORUS, supra note 227, ch. 15; Morocco FTA, supra note 313, 
ch.14; Oman FTA, supra note 313, ch.14; Panama TPA, supra note 313, ch.14; Peru TPA, 
supra note 313, ch.15; Singapore FTA, supra note 214, ch.14. 
 321 See Anupam Chander, Exporting DCMA Lockouts, 54 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 205, 211 
(2006). 
 322 See Keeping Our Balance in the Face of Piracy and Counterfeiting: Limiting the 
Scope of Intellectual Property Rights Enforcement Provisions in Free Trade Agreements, 42 
GEO. WASH. INT’L L. REV. 159, 171-72 (2010) [hereinafter Keeping Our Balance]. 
 323 Chander, supra note 321 at 216. See, e.g., Australia FTA, supra note 200, ch.17 (29 
pages); KORUS, supra note 227, ch.18 (34 pages); Panama TPA, supra note 313, ch.14 (32 
pages). 
 324 Kaminski, supra note 194, at 982. 
 325 See generally Keeping Our Balance, supra note 322, at 173; see also generally Ka-
minski, supra note 194, at 982. 
 326 Holleyman NDN Address, supra note 58. 
 327 Id. 
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his speech, Deputy USTR Robert Holleyman recognized how the Internet has 
transformed the global economy and called for action to modernize the interna-
tional trading system to promote an Internet-enabled economy for the future: 
I am speaking today about the digital economy and trade as a 21st century leadership 
imperative, because we stand at a crossroad. The rules we have in place in the interna-
tional trading system—historically championed by the U.S. I will add—have served 
us well, so far. They have helped enable the explosive growth of the Internet and dis-
semination of new technology, have led to rapid changes that have brought us closer 
together, allowed us to trade across borders, and have allowed some of the world’s 
greatest innovations to emanate from our shores. However, as someone who has 
worked at the intersection of technology and international trade for over two decades, 
I can speak with confidence when I say this: the trading rules that have helped us get 
to where we are today are no longer sufficient.328 
Deputy USTR Holleyman explained further that: 
The United States is also supporting provisions—for the first time in any trade agree-
ment—that will promote balance in copyright systems through exceptions and limita-
tions for legitimate purposes, such as criticism, comment, news reporting, teaching, 
scholarship, and research, including with respect to the digital environment.”329 
The Office of the USTR should build on Deputy Holleyman’s vision, espe-
cially as the Internet will become ubiquitous in increasingly more areas of 
commerce, entertainment, and social discourse.330 As this occurs, the Internet 
will challenge existing legal and regulatory structures around the globe. With 
the appropriate high level leadership, USTR can become a force for ensuring 
that such structures are appropriately dismantled or modified to facilitate the 
Internet’s growth. 
2.  Industry Trade Advisory Committees 
The ITAC system is crucial to the formation of trade policy. As the GAO 
found: 
The advisory committee system is unique in U.S. trade policy because it provides a 
forum in which business and other interested groups can consult confidentially with 
and provide advice to the executive branch on trade negotiations, U.S. trade policy, 
and implementation of trade agreements. The formal nature of advisory meetings 
helps ensure that representatives of the private sector and other groups have regular 
access to officials engaged in U.S. trade policy. Further, the system provides govern-
ment officials with a body of private sector experts with whom they can develop an 
ongoing dialogue.331 
                                                 
 328 Id. The USTR addressed the Internet or access to information in just one speech in 
2008 and one speech in 2015. Speeches/Transcripts, OFFICE OF U.S. TRADE REP., 
http://1.usa.gov/1N5tFOJ (last visited Apr. 4, 2016). 
 329 Holleyman NDN Address, supra note 58. 
 330 JANNA ANDERSON ET AL., PEW RES. CTR., DIGITAL LIFE IN 2025, at 5 (2014), 
http://pewrsr.ch/1nEvSoK. 
 331 GAO, ADVISORY COMMITTEE, supra note 251, at 10-11. 
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Former USTR officials have called the ITAC system “one of the great 
strengths of U.S. trade policy.”332 USTR and officials from the Department of 
Commerce alike have reported that the ITAC system has made valuable con-
tributions to U.S. trade policy over the years including in negotiations: (1) 
“multilateral agreements on information technology, financial services, and 
basic telecommunications; (2) the Uruguay Round of negotiations that led to 
establishment of the WTO; (3) as well as regional initiatives such as the North 
American Free Trade Agreement, the Summit of the Americas, and the Asia-
Pacific Economic Cooperation forum.”333 Negotiators commenting on the sys-
tem in the early 2000s have said that because it is institutionalized and seeks to 
be representative, it is a preferred means of obtaining input on trade policy.334 
However, in its 2007 review of FTAs and private sector consultations under 
the 2002 TPA, GAO had found that USTR needed to improve its management 
of the ITAC system.335 Its recommendations included improving information 
access for the committees, improving timeliness of re-chartering the commit-
tees, and providing more notice and time for the committees to meaningfully 
weigh in on trade policy.336 USTR should review and reform all ITACs to en-
sure that they are representative of each issue area. But in particular, it should 
form a new ITAC dedicated to the Internet and a second dedicated to access to 
information. 
There are sixteen technical and sectoral advisory committees that represent 
industry and agriculture.337 Despite the fact that these industries make broadly 
varying contributions to the U.S. economy, each ITAC is given approximately 
the same budget, operating procedure, and membership.338 In general, Congress 
                                                 
 332 Id. at 11.   
 333 Id. 
 334 Id. 
 335 U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-08-59, INTERNATIONAL TRADE: AN 
ANALYSIS OF FREE TRADE AGREEMENTS AND CONGRESSIONAL AND PRIVATE SECTOR CON-
SULTATIONS UNDER TRADE PROMOTION AUTHORITY 67 (2007). 
 336 See generally id. at 52-65. 
 337 MICHAEL B. G. FROMAN, OFFICE OF U.S. TRADE REP., 2014 ANNUAL REPORT 206 
(2014), http://1.usa.gov/1oA1elA. 
These committees are: Aerospace Equipment (ITAC 1); Automotive Equipment and Capital 
Goods (ITAC 2); Chemicals, Pharmaceuticals, Health/Science Products and Services (ITAC 
3); Consumer Goods (ITAC 4); Distribution Services (ITAC 5); Energy and Energy Ser-
vices (ITAC 6); Forest Products (ITAC 7); Information and Communication Technologies 
Services and Electronic Commerce (ITAC 8); Non-Ferrous Metals and Building Materials 
(ITAC 9); Services and Finance Industries (ITAC 10); Small and Minority Business (ITAC 
11); Steel (ITAC 12); Textiles and Clothing (ITAC 13); Customs Matters and Trade Facili-
tation (ITAC 14); Intellectual Property Rights (ITAC 15); and Standards and Technical 
Trade Barriers (ITAC 16). 
Id. 
 338 Each ITAC has operating costs between $40,000 to $60,000 per year, irregular meet-
ings at the call of the Secretary or USTR, and not more than 50 members. See, e.g., Industry 
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should undertake a review of the ITAC system to ensure the resources allocat-
ed to an ITAC meet the needs of a given sector, particularly as sectors develop 
and change over time. 
In particular, since the inception of the ITAC system, the Internet has revo-
lutionized the economy.339 But there is no ITAC dedicated to the Internet. The 
Information and Communications Technologies, Services, and Electronic 
Commerce ITAC is the closest to an Internet ITAC, but its focus goes well 
beyond the Internet.340 This group is focused predominantly on the technolo-
gies and infrastructure that make e-commerce, and trade online possible. 341 
However, the ITAC does not account for the consumer-facing benefits of the 
Internet, or that fact that the Internet is its own ecosystem of users, sellers, en-
trepreneurs, and creators.342 
The membership of this ITAC is telling. There are sixteen members, which 
include representatives from NETGEAR, Inc., Intel, and the Internet Infra-
structure coalition (“IIC”).343 These companies serve an important function in 
the Internet ecosystem: they build the ‘nuts and bolts’ of the Internet, or other 
technologies that facilitate the transmission of information through the web, 
and to the user. 344 For instance, IIC configures the physical network of net-
                                                                                                                 
Trade Advisory Committee on Automotive Equipment and Capital Goods Charter arts. 7, 
10, http://1.usa.gov/1UUj01y; Information and Communications Technologies, Services, 
and Electronic Commerce Charter arts. 7, 10, http://1.usa.gov/1KVecVP; Industry Trade 
Advisory Committee on Intellectual Property Rights Charter arts. 7, 10, 
http://1.usa.gov/239umTV. 
 339 See Internet Technical Advisory Committee to the OECD Charter art. II, 
http://bit.ly/1VLNrDE. 
 340 Industry Trade Advisory Committee on Information and Communications Technolo-
gies, Services, and Electronic Commerce Charter art. 3, http://1.usa.gov/1KVecVP. 
 341 Id. art. 4. 
 342 MANYIKA & ROXURGH, supra note 42, at 1. 
 343 Industry Trade Advisory Committee On Information and Communications Technolo-
gies, Services, and Electronic Commerce ITAC 8, INT’L TRADE ADMIN., 
http://bit.ly/24zKVGy (last visited Feb. 22, 2016). The full membership includes: Jacque-
lynn Ruff, Verizon Communications Inc.; Jennifer H. Sanford, Cisco Systems, Inc.; Arun K. 
Bhumitra, Arjay Telecommunications; Daniel W. Caprio, Jr., DC Strategies Consulting, 
LLC; Steven D. Domenikos, Ierion/Relay Dental, Inc., Dean Fealk, DLA Piper LLC Repre-
senting NETGEAR, Inc.; Arun P. Gupta, Caterpillar, Inc.; Jake E. Jennings, AT&T Ser-
vices, Inc.; Todd R. Loewenstein, ArcoStream LLC; Jennifer A. Manner, EchStar Corp.; 
Noel H. Nevshehir, Automation Alley; Wendy E. Owens, Divitius LLC; Greg S. Slater, 
Intel Corp., W. David Snead, Internet Infrastructure (i2) Coalition; Roszel C. Thomsen II, 
Alliance for Network Security; Stephen Zirschky, WatchGuard Technologies, Inc. Industry 
Trade Advisory Committee On Information and Communications Technologies, Services, 
and Electronic Commerce ITAC 8, INT’L TRADE ADMIN., http://bit.ly/24zKVGy (last visited 
Feb. 22, 2016). 
 344 See JOHN DEIGHTON & JOHN QUELCH, HAMILTON CONSULTANTS, INC., ECONOMIC 
VALUE OF THE ADVERTISING- SUPPORTED INTERNET ECOSYSTEM 6-7 (2009), 
http://bit.ly/1VLNsaP. 
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works that connects users around the globe. 345 While this and other technolo-
gy-focused functions are crucial to the continued growth of the Internet, and 
members in the ITAC should represent them, technology is less than half of the 
full picture. The companies in the ITAC are not representative of the full eco-
system of the Internet.346 
3. Department of Commerce 
Like the other entities that contribute to U.S. trade policy, the Department of 
Commerce’s decentralized structure lacks consistency. Its Industry Analysis 
unit is focused on developing and executing innovative international trade and 
investment policies and strategies. To support its objectives, ITA provides data 
and analysis on various industries, which include: Aerospace;347 Automotive;348 
Building Products, Construction, and Metals;349 Construction;350 Consumer 
Goods;351 E-Commerce, Information and Telecomm;352 Energy and Environ-
mental Industries;353 Financial Service; 354 Health; 355 Machinery; 356 Textiles and 
Apparel; 357 Service Industries; 358 and Travel and Tourism.359 
                                                 
 345 About i2Coalition, INTERNET INFRASTRUCTURE COAL., http://bit.ly/1WQyLWK (last 
visited Apr. 22, 2016). 
 346 Zachary Scott Simmons, Other-than-Industry Representation on Industry Trade Advi-
sory Committees, 31 U.C.L.A. PAC. BASIN. L.J. 147, 169-71 (2014) (arguing certain actors 
are underrepresented in Industry Trade Advisory Committees). 
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 348 Office of Transportation and Machinery – Automotive Team, INT’L TRADE ADMIN., 
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 349 Office of Materials Industries, INT’L TRADE ADMIN., http://1.usa.gov/1XYZu1O (last 
visited Feb. 22, 2016). 
 350 Id. 
 351 Office of Consumer Goods, INT’L TRADE ADMIN., http://1.usa.gov/1TPslGR (last vis-
ited Feb. 22, 2016). 
 352 Office of Technology and Electronic Commerce, INT’L TRADE ADMIN., 
http://1.usa.gov/1QlvtXo (last updated May 6, 2014). 
 353 Office of Energy and Environmental Industries, INT’L TRADE ADMIN., 
http://1.usa.gov/1no9n52 (last visited Feb. 22, 2016). 
 354 Office of Finance and Insurance, INT’L TRADE ADMIN., http://1.usa.gov/1Sgr2zE (last 
visited Feb. 14, 2016). 
 355 Health Industries, INT’L TRADE ADMIN., http://1.usa.gov/1RkLz19 (last visited Feb. 
22, 2016). 
 356 Office of Transportation and Machinery – Machinery Team, INT’L TRADE ADMIN., 
http://1.usa.gov/1YQNJKU (last visited Feb. 14, 2016). 
 357 Office of Textiles and Apparel, INT’L TRADE ADMIN., http://1.usa.gov/1pn3gGQ (last 
visited Feb. 14, 2016). 
 358 Office of Supply Chain, Professional, and Business Services, INT’L TRADE ADMIN., 
http://1.usa.gov/1Uxexjt (last visited Feb. 14, 2016). 
 359 Office of Travel and Tourism Industries, INT’L TRADE ADMIN., 
http://1.usa.gov/2177fmt (last visited Feb. 14, 2016). 
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ITA has the Office of Technology and Electronic Commerce (“OTEC”) lo-
cated within the Manufacturing and Services division.360 It has three teams: e-
commerce, information technology, and telecommunications.361 And it produc-
es numerous reports.362 However, its coverage of the information industry suf-
fers from similar issues as other “Internet”-focused trade entities: OTEC is 
asymmetrically focused on protections and enforcement.363 Many of the docu-
ments produced by the group cover policy issues related to data protection, 
privacy, and cybersecurity.364 While these areas are important, limiting inter-
mediary liability, and promoting information sharing and access online are 
crucial to the continued growth of the Internet, yet receive comparably little 
attention.365 
Within the Department of Commerce’s ITA Bureau, Congress could estab-
lish a bureau dedicated to the Internet and Access to Information (“IAI”). 
While the Department of Commerce does house other bureaus or offices whose 
responsibilities may partially cover the Internet or related industries, 366 a dedi-
                                                 
 360 About OTEC, OFFICE OF TECH. & ELEC. COMMERCE, http://1.usa.gov/1Tg1IuV (last 
updated Aug. 9, 2011). 
 361 Id. 
 362 OTEC’s site provides research by industry/sector for e-commerce, information tech-
nology, instrumentation, microelectronics, and telecommunications.  However, these re-
sources do not focus on current Internet law and policy issues.  Instead, the resources avail-
able through each of these portals focus on equipment, infrastructure, hardware and software 
for communication or for facilitating e-commerce. See Research by Industry/Sector, OFFICE 
OF TECH. & ELEC. COMMERCE, http://1.usa.gov/25HAEsG, (last visited Apr. 4, 2016); see 
also Publications and Newsletters, Office OF TECH. & ELEC. COMMERCE, 
http://1.usa.gov/1Qng4n8 (last updated Feb. 28, 2016). The OTEC site also offers ExportIT 
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formation and Communications Technology (ICT) Newsletter” focused most recently on 
international data protection, equipment and application export and competition trends.  Its’ 
most recently released newsletters for most sectors date back to 2011. See Global Infor-
mation and Communications Technology Newsletter, OFFICE OF TECH & ELEC. COMMERCE 
(Dec. 2, 2011), http://1.usa.gov/25HAS31. 
 363 Trade Policy Issues, OFFICE OF TECH. & ELEC. COMMERCE, http://1.usa.gov/1RxFPDz 
(last visited Feb. 14, 2016). 
 364 See, e.g., Office of Tech. and Elec. Commerce, United States-Japan Joint Statement 
on Promoting Global Cyber Security - Final Draft (Sept. 9, 2003), http://1.usa.gov/1TLjLss; 
Letter from Paula J. Bruening, Staff Counsel, The Ctr. for Democracy and Tech., to Eric M. 
Holloway, Office of Tech. and Elec. Commerce (on file with The Office of Technology and 
Electronic Commerce). 
 365 Trade Policy Issues, supra note 363. 
 366 See, e.g., Information Technology Portal – Overview, NAT’L INST. OF STANDARDS & 
TECH., http://1.usa.gov/1QSdxa6 (last visited Feb. 14, 2016) (covering cybersecurity, cloud 
computing, and other internet standards issues), About NTIS, NAT’L TECH. INFO. SERV., 
http://1.usa.gov/1WTWIKk (last visited Feb. 14, 2016) (promoting American innovation 
through disseminating technical information to the public and industry). 
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cated bureau would dedicate a higher level of attention and importance to In-
ternet-related trade policy issues. The National Telecommunications and In-
formation Administration and the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office ought to 
supplement and support the IAI. Additionally, the existing OTEC’s resources 
are clearly outdated, and do not cover large segments of the Internet econo-
my.367 OTEC could continue to collect data on technologies related to the infra-
structure and function of the Internet, while the IAI office would focus more 
intensively on the content services. It is important that DoC have an office 
providing current data and analysis of one of the significant and fastest-
growing sectors of the economy. A bureau focused on promoting the Internet 
and information access values through trade agreements is necessary to bring 
trade policy into the Internet age. 
The Department of Commerce has taken an important step toward reforming 
Internet trade policy.  Recently, the DoC borrowed a strategy that has worked 
well for the intellectual property sectors—coordinating with the Department of 
State to ensconce Internet law and policy attachés in key embassies throughout 
the world.368 In March 2016, the DoC announced the launch of a “digital atta-
ché program to address trade barriers.”369  In announcing the program, Secre-
tary of Commerce Penny Pritzker commendably recognized that “the entire 
world [is] living through one of the most remarkable economic and society 
transformations in history and it is being driven by technology.  In this chang-
ing world, economic growth and competitiveness are increasingly tied to the 
digital economy.”370  To promote continued growth in both the United States 
and abroad, the mission of such attachés should be to evangelize and educate 
lawmakers, judges, and regulators in other jurisdictions about the laws that 
make the Internet work. 371 Such attachés should also help U.S. Internet com-
panies engage with appropriate jurisdictions when such companies face protec-
                                                 
 367 OTEC’s Publications and Newsletters have not been updated since 2011. See, e.g., 
Tim Miles, Green IT, OFFICE OF TECH. & ELEC. COMMERCE (May 5, 2010), 
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 369 Penny Pritzker, Commerce Launches Digital Attaché Program to Address Trade Bar-
riers, DEP’T OF COMMERCE (Mar. 11, 2016), http://1.usa.gov/23bYr1r. The DoC also rolled 
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 370 Pritzker, supra note 369. 
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tionist or non-protectionist regulatory and legal barriers to providing services 
in the jurisdiction. The Patent and Trademark Office and the Department of 
State have had a similar program for the intellectual property industries for 
years, where “intellectual property attachés” are placed in key embassies where 
intellectual property industries face legal, regulatory or marketplace challeng-
es.372 
4. Congress 
Since the elevation of USTR to cabinet level in 1974,373 and the correspond-
ing formation of the ITAC system, hundreds of hearings have been dedicated 
to trade issues.374 From 1974 through 1980, there were 156 hearings on interna-
tional trade.375 However, only 13 of those—some 8%—covered IP-related is-
sues, and none mentioned the Internet or access to information.376 In the last 
five years, there were 178 hearings on international trade and 43 of those—
roughly 24%—covered IP-related issues and only 12%—addressed Internet 
related issues.377 While this does demonstrate an improvement especially with 
regard to IP issues, still more attention should be paid to ensuring that the in-
                                                 
 372 Intellectual Property (IP) Attaché Program, supra note 368. 
 373 Trade Act of 1974 § 141; About Us, OFFICE OF U.S. TRADE REP., 
http://1.usa.gov/1QK5juo (last visited Feb. 15, 2016). 
 374 Search “International Trade”, PROQUEST CONG., 
http://congressional.proquest.com/congressional (last visited Feb. 15, 2015) (totaling 772 
hearings; follow the “Search” hyperlink; then enter “international trade” and select “com-
mittee hearings”; filter only “Senate Committee on Finance” and “House Ways and Means 
Committee”; bounded by year 1974-2016). 
 375 Search “International Trade”, PROQUEST CONG., 
http://congressional.proquest.com/congressional (last visited Feb. 14, 2015) (totaling 156 
hearings; follow the “Search” hyperlink; then enter “international trade” and select “com-
mittee hearings”; filter only “Senate Committee on Finance” and “House Ways and Means 
Committee”; bounded by year 1974-1980). 
 376 Search “International Trade”, PROQUEST CONG., 
http://congressional.proquest.com/congressional (last visited Feb. 14, 2015) (totaling 13 
hearings; follow the “Search” hyperlink; then enter “international trade” and filter by “intel-
lectual property”; select “committee hearings” and filter only “Senate Committee on Fi-
nance” and “House Ways and Means Committee”; bounded by year 1974-1980). 
 377 Search “International Trade”, PROQUEST CONG., 
http://congressional.proquest.com/congressional (last visited Feb. 14, 2015) (totaling 178 
hearings; follow the “Search” hyperlink; then enter “international trade” bounded by year 
2010-2016); Search “International Trade”, PROQUEST CONG., 
http://congressional.proquest.com/congressional (last visited Feb. 14, 2015) (totaling 43 
hearings; follow the “Search” hyperlink; then enter “international trade” and “intellectual 
property; bounded by year 2010-2016); Search “International Trade”, PROQUEST CONG., 
http://congressional.proquest.com/congressional (last visited Feb. 14, 2015) (totaling 23 
hearings; follow the “Search” hyperlink; then enter “international trade” and “internet”; 
bounded by year 2010-2016). 
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formation access is a more central focus of Congress. 
V. CONCLUSION: STRUCTURAL RECOMMENDATIONS 
A. Creation of an Ambassador for Access to Information and an Ambassador 
for the Internet within USTR 
As the evidence above shows, USTR’s speeches and trade agreements dedi-
cate the least attention to the Internet economy of any industry sector. Con-
gress should establish an Ambassador for Access to Information and an Am-
bassador for the Internet, which will focus on promoting sound legal policies 
that protect the Internet and promote access to information. These individuals 
will oversee the proposed ITACs on the Internet and Access to Information, 
and facilitate the relationship between USTR, ITACs, Congress, the Depart-
ment of Commerce, and U.S. trade partners to advance these objectives. 
B. Establishment of ITACs for the Internet and for Access to Information 
Consistent with the current trend of expanding the role of ITACs as trade 
policy develops, Congress should create an ITAC for the Internet and for Ac-
cess to Information. Addressing these sectors of the economy and aspects of 
trade policy through dedicated groups with perspective and support would sig-
nificantly increase the ability of U.S. trade to reflect the importance of the In-
ternet and information access today. 
C. Creation of an Office of Information Access and the Internet with the 
Department of Commerce 
Creation of an Office of Information Access and the Internet (“OIAI”) 
would allow the Department of Commerce to focus anew on the Internet and 
information access. 378 Its OTEC teams could remain in place to support the 
new Office, which would be centered on the legal and policy goals necessary 
to protect and promote the Internet and Information access. OIAI could also 
draw on NTIA, the Census Bureau and other bodies housed within Commerce 
to advance its objectives. 
                                                 
 378 CDD and USPIRG Urge Commerce Department to Protect Consumers Online, CTR. 
FOR DIG. DEM. (Jan. 28, 2011) http://bit.ly/1LO6hV3 (“The Department of Commerce is not 
positioned to play a leading role formulating and enacting meaningful public policies ensur-
ing that consumers can have trust in the digital marketing environment.”). 
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D. Establish a Program within the Department of Commerce to Place “Internet 
attachés” in key embassies. 
The Department should model its newly-launched digital attaché program 
after the existing “intellectual property attaché” program to place Internet poli-
cy experts in embassies around the world, where U.S. Internet companies face 
legal, regulatory, or marketplace challenges. Such attaches would serve to 
evangelize with local judges, lawmakers, and regulators the laws and policies 
that make the Internet work. In addition, such attaches could assist U.S. Inter-
net companies that face specific challenges in jurisdictions abroad. Supported 
by stronger Internet-focused bodies and policies in other U.S. trade entities, the 
attaché will support U.S. businesses, promote trade, and export the laws and 
policies that have driven the rise of the Internet economy. 
